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I.	 INTRODUCTION	My	 dear	 compatriots,	 as	 I	 speak,	 terrorist	 attacks	 of	unprecedented	 proportions	 are	 underway	 in	 the	 Paris	 area.	There	are	dozens	killed,	there	are	many	injured.	It	is	a	horror.1	Francois	 Holland,	 President	 of	 the	 French	 Republic	 on	November	14,	2015.	The	day	of	the	Paris	terrorist	attacks,	the	deadliest	to	occur	in	France	since	the	end	of	World	War	II.	The	 terrorist	 attacks	 in	 Paris	 and	 Copenhagen	 of	 2015	brought	 anxiety	 and	 shock	 to	 Europe.	 Despite	 the	 social	 and	emotional	consequences	for	the	citizens	of	the	European	Union,	the	political	and	legal	consequences	on	the	European	legislative	level	are	 occupying	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	(hereinafter	 “CJEU”	 or	 “the	 Court”)	 today.2	 The	 terrorist	 attacks	lead	 to	 a	 tightening	 of	 the	 firearms	 legislation	 in	 the	 European	Union.3	Namely,	Directive	 2017/853,	which	 governs	 the	 firearm	legislation	 in	 the	 European	 Union,	 is	 a	 direct	 far-reaching	implication	and	consequence	of	the	terrorist	attacks	of	2015.	This	Directive	tightens	the	firearms	regime	in	the	European	Union	and	sets	the	common	floor	of	firearms	regulation	for	all	Member	States	of	 the	European	Union.	This	article	discusses	 the	 implications	of	this	latest	Directive	on	firearms	possession	in	the	European	Union.	While	in	the	United	States,	the	right	to	bear	arms	is	enshrined	in	 the	US	Constitution,4	 the	 citizens	of	 the	Member	States	of	 the	European	Union	have	no	similar	rights.	The	legislation	of	firearms	is	a	topic	that	is	vastly	differently	treated	in	the	United	States	and	in	 the	 European	 Union.	 Whereas	 in	 the	 European	 Union,	 the	societal	 and	 cultural	 history	 of	 firearms	 is	 characterized	 by	regulation	and	disarmament	since	the	middle	of	the	20th	century	
                                                        1.	 François	Hollande,	 President,	 Fr.,	French	 President	Hollande’s	 Televised	 Address,	THOMSON	REUTERS	(Nov.	13,	2015),	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-hollande-address-idUSKCN0T302N20151114	[https://perma.cc/8J6P-R7UG].	2.	 Case	C-482/17,	Czech	v.	Eur.	Parl.	&	Council	of	the	Eur.	Union,	2019	E.C.R.	I-1035.		3.	 The	European	Agenda	 on	 Security,	 at	 17,	 COM	 (2015)	185	 final	 (Apr.	 28,	 2015)	[hereinafter	The	European	Agenda].	4.	 U.S.	CONST.	amend.	II.	
858	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	after	two	World	Wars	disrupted	the	continent,5	the	United	States	have	a	history	of	civil	defense	and	the	constitutional	right	to	bear	arms.6	On	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	the	topic	of	firearms	legislation	inflames	heated	debate	among	firearms	enthusiasts,	pacifists,	and	even	legal	scholars.	This	 Article	 will	 discuss	 the	 wider	 question	 of	 firearms	regulation	by	 analyzing	 the	 firearms	 legislation	of	 the	European	Union.	 This	 article	 analyses	 the	 three	 consecutive	 Firearms	Directives,	 which	 have	 been	 enacted	 over	 time	 by	 the	 EU	legislature,	 the	 legal	 challenge	 of	 the	 Firearms	 Directive	 at	 the	CJEU,	 and	 the	 comparative	perspective	 of	 firearms	 regulation	 in	the	European	Union	and	the	United	States.	This	article	aims	to	take	an	 objective	 viewpoint	 and	 spare	 any	 emotionally	 heated	policy	argument.	 The	 debate	 to	 which	 degree	 firearms	 legislation	influences	crimes	such	as	homicide,	robbery	or	terrorist	acts,	shall	and	cannot	be	discussed	in	the	limited	space	of	this	article.	Instead,	the	focal	point	will	be	the	legal	debate	about	firearms	regulation	in	a	federal	system	and	the	legislative	competence	exercised	by	the	federal	lawmaker.	This	 article	 aims	 to	 give	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 legislation	 of	firearms	in	the	European	Union.	The	structure	of	the	article	is	as	follows.	In	Part	II,	the	three	consecutive	Firearms	Directives	of	the	European	Union	shall	be	discussed	on	a	historical	and	legal	basis.7	Identifying	the	crucial	aspects	of	the	different	legislative’s	waves	in	the	area	of	firearms	regulation.	In	Part	III,	the	judicial	proceedings	in	front	of	the	CJEU	in	case	C-482/17	(Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	
and	Council)	shall	be	discussed,	since	 it	determined	whether	 the	CJEU	is	willing	to	guide	the	EU	on	a	continuous	federal	path	in	view	of	 a	 tightened	 regime	 on	 civilian	 firearms	 possession.	 In	 this	proceeding,	 the	Czech	Republic	contended	the	newest	version	of	the	 Firearms	 Directive	 of	 the	 EU	 on	 the	 Union’s	 legislative	competence.	In	Part	IV,	a	consideration	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	
                                                        5.	 See	generally	ALEXIS	HERACLIDES,	SECURITY	AND	CO-OPERATION	IN	EUROPE:	THE	HUMAN	DIMENSION,	1972	-	1992		(1993).	6.	 Lawrence	Delbert	 Cress,	An	Armed	 Community:	 The	Origins	 and	Meaning	 of	 the	
Right	to	Bear	Arms,	71	J.	AM.	HIST.	22,	22-23	(1984).	7.	 Council	Directive	91/477/	EEC	of	18	Jun.	1991	on	Control	of	the	Acquisition	and	Possession	of	Weapons;	Council	Directive	2008/51/EC,	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	21	May	2008	Amending	Council	Directive	91/477/EEC;	Council	Directive	2017/853,	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 May	 17	 2017	 Amending	Council	Directive	91/477/EEC.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 859	United	States	(hereinafter	“SCOTUS”	or	“USSC”)	Lopez	decision	in	light	 of	 the	 judicial	 proceedings	 at	 the	 CJEU	 shall	 be	 made.	 A	comparison	between	both	cases	can	be	highly	fruitful	to	derive	a	comparative	understanding	of	the	exercise	of	a	federal	competence	to	 regulate	 firearms.	 Specifically,	 to	 compare	 the	 stance,	 the	highest	court	of	the	respective	legal	system	took	in	their	respective	landmark	 judgments	 regarding	 the	 competence	 of	 the	 federal	lawmaker	to	regulate	firearms.	
II.	 THE	EUROPEAN	UNION’S	LEGISLATIVE	HISTORY	ON	
FIREARMS	REGULATION	The	 impetus	 of	 change	 has	 caught	 on	 in	 every	 sphere	 of	Community	 activity.	 There	 will	 be	 a	 single	 market	 for	everything	from	transport	to	energy	to	spin-off	products	from	scientific	 advances.	 The	 result,	 already	 percolating	 through,	will	be	a	wider	choice	for	consumers.8	Jaques	 Delors,	 President	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	 on	January	 17,	 1989,	 in	 an	 address	 given	 to	 the	 European	Parliament.	Reiterating	the	new	competence	of	the	European	Communities	in	enacting	legislation	on	interstate	commerce.	The	European	Union	derived	its	competence	to	deal	with	the	federal	regulation	of	 firearms	via	the	establishment	of	 the	single	market	in	Europe.	The	single	market	was	the	most	important	and	ambitious	project	of	the	European	Union	with	widest	implications	for	consumers	and	ramifications	in	nearly	every	policy	area.	The	United	Kingdom’s	European	Commissioner	Lord	Arthur	Cockfield	initiated	the	process	to	 implement	a	single	market	 in	the	EU.	He	proposed,	as	Commissioner	for	Internal	Market	and	Services	under	Jaques	Delors,	a	White	Paper	in	1985,	identifying	300	measures	to	be	 addressed	 in	 order	 to	 complete	 a	 single	market.9	 The	White	Paper	was	well	received	by	Jaques	Delors	and	led	to	the	adoption	of	the	Single	European	Act	(hereinafter	“the	SEA”),	a	revolutionary	treaty	revision	that	reformed	the	decision-making	mechanisms	of	the	European	Economic	Community	(hereinafter	“the	EEC”).10	 In	
                                                        8.	 Jaques	Delors,	 President,	 Eur.	 Comm'n,	Address	Given	by	 Jacques	Delors	 to	 the	European	Parliament	(Jan.	17,	1989).	9.	 Comm’n	of	the	Eur.	Communities	White	Paper	on	Completing	the	Internal	Market,	at	15,	COM	(85)	310	final	(June	14,	1985).	10.	 JOSEPH	 WEILER,	 THE	 CONSTITUTION	 OF	 EUROPE	 :	 DO	 THE	 NEW	 CLOTHES	 HAVE	 AN	EMPEROR?	63	-	66		(1999).	
860	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	particular,	 the	 SEA	 established	 Article	 100a,	 which	 gave	 the	European	Union	the	competence	to	legislate	in	all	kinds	of	policy	areas	 with	 the	 aim	 to	 provide	 a	 frictionless	 single	 market	 in	Europe.11	Eventually,	one	of	these	newly	derived	competences	was	the	 competence	 to	 regulate	 firearms	 trade	 in	 the	 single	market.	Federal	 firearms	 legislation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 progressed	simultaneously	 with	 European	 integration,	 and	 it	 may	 well	 be	described	as	a	consequence	of	European	integration.	The	history	of	European	legislation	of	firearms	starts	with	the	White	Paper	on	the	Single	Market	in	1985,	in	which	a	measure	for	the	approximation	of	firearms	legislation	was	first	mentioned	by	the	 European	 Commission	 (hereinafter	 “the	 Commission”).	 The	following	first	Directive	from	1991	on	the	approximation	of	laws	in	 the	 area	 of	 firearms	 legislation	 was	 mainly	 driven	 by	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	 SEA	 from	 1986	 and	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 Schengen	 Agreement	 from	 1985.12	 This	Directive	falls	into	the	phase	of	European	Integration,	in	which	the	European	Union	constituted	an	intergovernmental	body	called	the	European	Communities.13	The	second	step	of	harmonization	in	the	area	of	firearms	was	driven	by	the	implementation	of	the	UN	Protocol	against	the	Illicit	Manufacturing	of	and	Trafficking	in	Firearms	from	2001,14	which	resulted	in	the	amending	of	the	first	Directive	in	2008.	At	the	time	of	 the	 second	 step	 of	 firearms	 harmonization,	 the	 European	Communities	 had	 become	 the	 European	 Community	 by	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty	 and	 subsequently	 had	 gained	 more	competences.15	The	latest	step	in	the	harmonization	of	European	firearms	legislation	had	its	impetus	in	the	terrorist	attacks	in	Paris	and	 Copenhagen	 of	 2015,	 which	 prompted	 the	 Commission	 to	bring	 forward	 a	 new	 legislative	 proposal,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	
                                                        11.	 Id.	at	66	-	72.	12.	 Kristin	Ashley	Tessman,	A	Bright	Day	for	the	Black	Market:	Why	Council	Directive	
2008/51/EC	Will	Lose	the	Battle	Against	Illicit	Firearm	Trade	in	the	European	Union,	38	GA.	J.	INT'L	&	COMP.	L.	237,	247-48	(2009).	13.	 The	 Treaty	 Establishing	 a	 Single	 Council	 and	 a	 Single	 Commission	 of	 the	European	Communities		art.	1,	Apr.	8,	1965,	1967	O.J.	(152)	2.	14.	 G.A.	 Res.	 55/255,	 annex,	 Protocol	 against	 the	 Illicit	 Manufacturing	 of	 and	Trafficking	in	Firearms,	Their	Parts	and	Components	and	Ammunition,	supplementing	the	U.N.	Convention	Against	Transnational	Organized	Crime,	at	art.	2	(June	8,	2001).		15.	 Treaty	on	European	Union,	Council	of	the	Eur.	Communities	&	Comm'n	of	the	Eur.	Communities,	art.	A-B,	Feb.	7,	1992,	1992	O.J.	(C	191)	1.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 861	most	recent	Directive	of	2017.	The	final	legislation	in	the	area	of	firearms	was	adopted	under	the	framework	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty,16	which	is	the	legal	framework	of	the	European	Union	as	we	know	it	today.	 The	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 gives	 the	 European	 Union	 wide	competences	to	legislate	in	many	policy	areas.17	As	described,	the	harmonization	of	 firearms	legislation	finds	it	raison	d’être	 in	the	single	 market	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 area	 without	 border	 controls,	which	the	EU	provides	for	its	citizens	(the	Schengen	Agreement).	We	shall	approach	the	existing	legislation	in	a	chronological	order	to	gain	an	overview	of	the	existing	framework.	
A.	Council	Directive	91/477/EEC	-	The	Promotion	of	Free	Movement	
and	the	Need	to	Ensure	Internal	Security	With	 the	 SEA	 of	 1986,	 then	 the	 European	 Communities	committed	 itself	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 single	 market	 in	Europe.18	The	SEA	might	be	one	of	the	most	underestimated	treaty	revisions	of	the	European	Union.19	With	the	shift	towards	majority	voting	 in	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (hereinafter	 “the	Council”)	 and	 the	 envisaged	 enactment	 of	 the	 single	 market	 by	1992,20	the	SEA	was	the	impetus	for	the	European	Union	as	it	exists	today.21	Further,	the	accord	on	the	Schengen	Agreement	in	1985,	from	five	of	the	ten	Member	States	at	that	time,	made	it	necessary	to	 establish	 a	 secure	 area	within	 the	 common	borders.22	 This	 is	clearly	formulated	in	Directive	91/477/EEC:	“[t]he	total	abolition	of	controls	and	formalities	at	intra-Community	frontiers	entails	the	fulfillment	of	certain	fundamental	conditions.”23	Since	there	would	be	no	border	controls	between	the	Member	States,	it	was	vital	to	ensure	 that	 the	 Member	 States	 adhere	 to	 the	 same	 minimum	
                                                        16.	 Treaty	 of	 Lisbon	 Amending	 the	 Treaty	 on	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Treaty	Establishing	the	European	Community,	Dec.	13,	2007,	2007	O.J.	(C	306)	1.		17.	 See	 generally	 Jürgen	 Bast,	 New	 Categories	 of	 Acts	 after	 the	 Lisbon	 Reform:	
Dynamics	of	Parliamentarization	in	EU	Law,	49	COMMON	MARKET	L.	REV.	(2012).		18.	 Single	European	Act	sec	II,	June	29,	1987,	1987	O.J.	(L	169)	1.	19.	 JOSEPH	 WEILER,	 THE	 CONSTITUTION	 OF	 EUROPE:	 “DO	 THE	 NEW	 CLOTHES	 HAVE	 AN	EMPEROR?”	AND	OTHER	ESSAYS	ON	EUROPEAN	INTEGRATION	65	(1999).		20.	 Comm'n	of	the	Eur.	Communities	White	Paper	on	Completing	the	Internal	Market,	
supra	note	9,	at	4.	21.	 Christina	 Eigel,	 Internal	 Security	 in	 an	 Open	 Market:	 The	 European	 Union	
Addresses	 the	 Need	 for	 Community	 Gun	 Control,	 18	 B.C.	 INT'L	 &	 COMP.	 L.	 REV.	 429,	 430	(1995).	22.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	248-49.	23.	 Council	Directive	91/477/EEC,	supra	note	7,	Recital	3.		
862	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	standards	 of	 firearms	 regulation.	 “[T]he	 abolition	 of	 controls	 on	the	 safety	 of	 objects	 transported	 and	 on	persons	 entails,	 among	other	 things,	 the	 approximation	 of	 weapon	 legislation.”24	 The	single	 market	 and	 the	 envisaged	 borderless	 travel	 area	 (the	Schengen	 Agreement),	 therefore,	 made	 it	 necessary	 to	 find	common	 ground	 on	 a	 firearms	 regime	 in	 the	 European	Communities.	In	fact,	“[a]rticles	77-90	of	the	Schengen	Agreement	dealt	specifically	with	the	harmonization	of	national	firearms	and	ammunition	 legislation.”25	 However,	 since	 the	 Schengen	Agreement	was	a	treaty	outside	the	European	Communities,	and	only	later	implemented	under	the	umbrella	of	the	European	Union,	a	mirroring	legislation	within	the	European	Communities	had	to	be	created.	1.	 The	Way	Leading	to	the	First	Directive	on	Firearms	Regulation	in	the	European	Union	Already	 in	 1985,	 the	 Commission’s	 White	 Paper	 on	 the	completion	of	the	single	market	by	1992	announced	a	proposal	on	the	 harmonization	 of	 Member	 States’	 firearms	 legislation.26	Interestingly,	“[t]he	purpose	of	the	legislation	was	not	to	increase	the	 control	 of	 firearms,	 but	 rather	 to	 harmonize	 gun	 control	standards	 […].”27	 Member	 States	 had	 different	 regimes	 that	governed	 firearms	 in	 their	 territory.	 However,	 the	 aim	 of	 the	Directive	was	 essentially	 to	provide	minimum	standards	 for	 the	acquisition	 and	 possession	 of	 firearms	 within	 the	 European	Communities.28	 The	 single	market	 and	 the	 Schengen	Agreement	with	 its	 borderless	 travel	 possibilities	 for	 individuals	 also	increased	 the	 likelihood	 of	 firearm	 smuggling	 and	 trafficking	 by	criminals.29	 Finally,	 the	 Commission	 drafted	 a	 proposal	 for	 the	Directive	 in	1987,	within	the	process	of	establishing	the	 internal	market.	This	proposal	was	accepted	by	the	Council	in	1991,	after	a	process	of	intensive	discussion	between	Council,	Commission,	and	the	European	Parliament	(hereinafter	“the	Parliament”).	30			
                                                        24.	 Id.	25.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	249.	26.	 Comm’n	of	the	Eur.	Communities	White	Paper	on	Completing	the	Internal	Market,	
supra	note	9,	at	15.			27.	 Eigel,	supra	note	21,	at	431.	28.	 Council	Directive	91/477/EEC,	supra	note	7,	art.	15(4).	29.	 Id.	30.	 Eigel,	supra	note	21,	at	430-31.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 863	2.	 The	Categorization	of	Firearms	in	the	Directive	The	Directive	of	1992	establishes	a	categorization	of	firearms	in	four	categories	(A)	prohibited	weapons;	(B)	weapons	subject	to	authorization;	(C)	weapons	subject	 to	declaration;	and	(D)	other	weapons.31	All	kinds	of	military	firearms	would	fall	under	category	A,	 and	 are	 therefore	 prohibited.32	 Firearms,	 such	 as	 semi-automatic	 firearms,	would	 fall	 in	 category	B,	 and	 are,	 therefore,	subject	 to	 authorization	 from	 the	 Member	 States	 authority.33	Firearms	in	category	C,	such	as	less	dangerous	firearms,	must	be	declared	 to	 the	 Member	 States	 authority.34	 A	 lighthouse	achievement	by	the	Directive	was	certainly	the	European	Firearms	Certificate	(today	the	European	Firearms	Pass),	which	functions	as	a	 community-wide	 weapon	 pass	 and	 must	 be	 carried	 by	 the	weapon	 holder	 when	 traveling	 to	 another	 Member	 State.35	Directive	91/477/EEC	explains:	“[p]assing	from	one	Member	State	to	another	while	in	possession	of	a	weapon	should,	in	principle,	be	prohibited	;	whereas	a	derogation	therefrom	is	acceptable	only	if	a	procedure	 is	 adopted	 that	 enables	Member	 States	 to	be	notified	that	a	firearm	is	to	be	brought	into	their	territory.”36	3.	 The	Legislative	Process	for	Adopting	the	Directive	The	procedure	for	adopting	the	Directive	was	characterized	by	 consensus	building	 in	 the	Council.	 “The	United	Kingdom,	 […]	was	greatly	concerned	about	the	ability	of	sportsmen	to	carry	guns	freely	 across	 internal	 borders	 without	 prior	 permission.”37	 This	issue	 could	 be	 solved	 with	 the	 European	 Firearms	 Certificate.	Having	said	that,	the	Parliament	in	its	role	as	an	advisory	body	at	that	time	was	involved	in	the	process.	“The	parliament	approved	the	amended	proposal,	but	also	sought	 to	clarify	and	tighten	the	requirements.”38	 However,	 not	 all	 recommendations	 of	 the	Parliament	had	been	adopted	by	the	Commission.39	The	Council	of	
                                                        31.	 Council	Directive	91/477/EEC,	supra	note	7,	annex	I.		32.	 Id.	33.	 Eigel,	supra	note	21,	at	434.		34.	 Id.	at	435	-	36.		35.	 Id.	at	435.		36.	 Council	Directive	91/477/EEC,	supra	note	7,	at	Recital	6.	37.	 Eigel,	supra	note	21,	at	434.			38.	 Id.	at	436.		39.	 Id.		
864	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	the	 European	 Communities	 adopted	 the	 Directive,	 after	consultation	of	the	Parliament,	on	June	18,	1991.40	“The	Member	States	 had	 until	 January	 1,	 1993,	 to	 pass	 all	 legislation	 and	regulations	necessary	to	implement	the	Directive.”41	Despite	minor	national	modifications	and	adjustments,	the	regimes	of	the	already	participating	 Member	 States	 were	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	Directive.42	 Only	 Finland	 and	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 when	 they	respectively	joined	the	European	Union	in	1995	and	2004	had	to	substantially	redraft	new	firearms	legislation	to	comply	with	the	EU	 standard.43	 “Finland,	 in	 contrast,	 did	not	pass	 any	 legislation	regulating	firearms	until	1998	–	only	after	Directive	91/477/EEC	took	effect.	Finland	established	only	 the	minimum	requirements	for	compliance	with	the	EU	Directive	on	harmonization.”44	The	legal	basis	for	the	Directive	was	Article	100	A	of	the	EEC	Treaty,	which	 allowed	 for	 the	 approximation	 of	 laws,	which	 are	necessary	 for	 the	 establishment	 and	 functioning	 of	 the	 internal	market.45	This	article,	an	achievement	of	the	SEA,	can	be	compared	to	the	Commerce	Clause	in	the	United	States	federal	legal	system	since	it	provides	the	legislature	with	a	wide	competence	to	adopt	federal	laws	regulation	all	kinds	of	interstate	commerce.	In	the	EU	legal	 system,	 interstate	 commerce	 is	 built	 upon	 the	 principle	 of	mutual	 recognition.46	The	Member	States	would	 recognize	other	Member	 States’	 standards	 on	 certain	 categories	 of	 goods	 and,	therefore,	 provide	 frictionless	 full	 access	 to	 their	 markets.47	Notably,	the	Directive	already	includes	and	envisages	the	idea	of	“[m]utual	 confidence	 in	 the	 field	 of	 protection	 of	 the	 safety	 of	persons	which	these	rules	will	generate	between	Member	States	[…].”48	This	is	the	concept	that	was	further	revisited	and	embraced	
                                                        40.	 Id.	at	437.	41.		Id.	42.	 Id.	43.	 HE	 183/1997	 Hallituksen	 esitys	 Eduskunnalle	 ampuma-aselaiksi	 ja	 laiksi	poliisilain	 23	 §:n	 sekä	 laiksi	 poliisin	 henkilörekistereistä	 annetun	 lain	 19	 ja	 20	 §:n	muuttamisesta	(Finnish	Parliament	ed.,	1997);	Act	No.	119/2002	Coll.,	on	Firearms	and	Ammunition	§	119/2002	(Parliament	of	the	Czech.	ed.,	2002).		44.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	247.		45.	 Single	European	Act,	supra	note	18,	art.	100a.		46.	 See	generally	CHRISTINE	JANSSENS,	THE	PRINCIPLE	OF	MUTUAL	RECOGNITION	IN	EU	LAW	(2013).	47.	 Id.	Part	I.	48.	 Council	Directive	91/477/EEC,	supra	note	7,	at	Recital	5.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 865	by	 the	CJEU	 in	 the	concept	of	mutual	 trust	between	the	Member	States.49	 4.	 The	Wider	Implications	of	the	Directive	There	 were	 direct	 impacts	 and	 consequences	 by	 this	 first	Directive	on	firearms	trade	and	possession	in	the	European	Union.	Scientific	studies	yield	that	already	the	harmonization	by	Directive	91/477/EEC	leads	to	a	significant	decrease	of	firearm	suicide	and	homicide	in	the	particular	Member	States	like	Austria.50	Finally,	it	is	important	to	notice	that	the	creation	of	the	single	market	and	the	Schengen	Agreement	required	a	common	security	standard	within	the	 borders.	 Therefore,	 a	 common	 minimum	 standard	 on	 the	acquisition	 and	 possession	 of	 firearms	 had	 to	 be	 established,	which,	 in	 turn,	 would	 create	 mutual	 confidence	 between	 the	Member	 States.	 As	 Tessman	 writes,	 “[t]he	 1991	 Directive,	 […],	embodied	a	compromise	between	Member	State	concerns	arising	from	 the	 abolition	of	 internal-frontiers	 controls	 and	 the	need	 to	control	 the	 acquisition	 and	 possession	 of	 firearms	 among	 the	Member	 States.”51	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 Directive	 established	 a	common	 floor	 for	 firearms	 legislation	 in	 the	 European	 Union,	which	the	Member	States	were	required	to	implement	and	to	abide	by.	
B.	 Council	Directive	2008/51/EC	–	Tackling	Illicit	Firearms	Trade	
in	the	European	Community	The	 next	 major	 achievement	 in	 the	 process	 of	 a	 unified	firearms	 legislation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 was	 Directive	2008/51/EC,	 which	 amended	 Directive	 91/477/EEC.52	 This	Directive	falls	into	a	different	phase	of	European	integration.	The	European	 Communities	 had	 become	 the	 European	 Community	
                                                        49.	 See	generally	Koen	Lenaerts,	La	vie	après	l’avis:	Exploring	the	Principle	of	Mutual	
(Yet	Not	Blind)	Trust,	54	COMMON	MKT.	L.	REV.	805	(2017).	50.	 Nestor	D.	Kapusta	et	al.,	Firearm	Legislation	Reform	in	the	European	Union:	Impact	
on	 Firearm	 Availability,	 Firearm	 Suicide	 and	 Homicide	 Rates	 in	 Austria,	 191	 BRITISH	 J.	PSYCHIATRY	253,	257	(2007).		51.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	252.		52.	 Parliament	&	Council,	Directive	2008/51/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	 Council	 amending	 Council	 Directive	 91/477/EEC	 on	 control	 of	 the	 acquisition	 and	possession	 of	 weapons	 	 §	 2008/51/EC	 (European	 Union	 ed.,	 Official	 Journal	 of	 the	European	Union		2008).	
866	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	with	the	signing	of	the	Maastricht	Treaty	in	1992.53	The	Maastricht	Treaty	 reformed	 and	 amended	 the	 Treaties	 establishing	 the	European	 Communities.54	 It	 renamed	 the	 European	 Economic	Community	 to	 European	 Community	 to	 reflect	 its	 expanded	competences	beyond	economic	matters.55	The	Maastricht	Treaty	provided	 the	 European	 Community	 with	 more	 competences	 in	fields	 such	 as	 citizenship	 law	 or	 external	 relations	 with	 third	states.56	 It	 established	 the	 European	 Community	 as	 a	 hybrid	international	actor,	reflecting	a	number	of	tensions	built	into	the	roots	of	the	Treaty.57	One	consequence	was	that	the	Commission	was	 able	 to	 sign	 treaties	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 as	 a	 regional	economic	 integration	 organization.58	 The	 Commission	 exercised	this	new	competence	by	–	 inter	alia	-	signing	the	United	Nations	Protocol	 Against	 the	 Illicit	 Manufacturing	 of	 and	 Trafficking	 in	Firearms,	 Their	 Parts,	 Components	 and	Ammunition.59	With	 the	accession	 to	 the	 UN	 Protocol,	 the	 European	 Community	 had	 to	amend	the	Directive	91/477/EEC	to	comply	with	the	content	of	the	protocol.60	 1.	 The	Way	Leading	to	the	Directive	The	impetus	for	this	intra-EU	reform	on	firearms	legislation	came	 from	 the	 outside,	 as	 “[t]he	 United	 Nations	 adopted	 a	resolution	 in	 2001	 establishing	 the	 United	 Nations	 Convention	against	 Transnational	 Organized	 Crime	 (Organized	 Crime	Convention).”61	 Consequently,	 “[t]he	 UN	 General	 Assembly	adopted	a	resolution,	[…],	to	supplement	this	Convention	with	the	Protocol	 Against	 the	 Illicit	 Manufacturing	 of	 and	 Trafficking	 in	
                                                        53.	 Treaty	on	European	Union,	supra	note	15,	at	art.	A.	54.	 See	 generally	 Trevor	 C.	 Hartley,	 Constitutional	 and	 Institutional	 Aspects	 of	 the	
Maastricht	Agreement,	42	INT'L	COMP.	L.	Q.	(1993).	55.	 Id.	56.	 Treaty	 on	 European	Union,	 supra	note	 15,	 at	 art.	 20(1);	 see	 generally	Michael	Smith,	Still	Rooted	in	Maastricht:	EU	External	Relations	as	a	‘Third-Generation	Hybrid’,	34	J.	EUR.	INTEGRATION	699	(2012).		57.	 Smith,	supra	note	56,	at	699.		58.	 See,	e.g.,	CHARLOTTE	BRETHERTON	&	JOHN	VOGLER,	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	AS	A	GLOBAL	ACTOR	(2d	ed.	2005).		59.		G.A.	Res.	55/255,	supra	note	12,	art.	1.		60.		Directive	2008/51,	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	21	May	2008	Amending	Council	Directive	91/477/EEC	on	Control	of	the	Acquisition	and	Possession	of	Weapons,	Recital	3	§	2008/51/EC,	2008/51/EC,	O.J.	(L	179)	5.	61.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	250.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 867	Firearms,	 Their	 Parts	 and	 Components	 and	 Ammunition	 (UN	Protocol).”62	 In	 January	 2002,	 the	 Commission	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	European	 Community	 signed	 the	 Protocol.	 The	 Commission	inferred	 the	 competence	 to	 sign	 the	 Protocol	 from	 its	 internal	market	 competence,	 by	 the	 implied	 external	 powers	 doctrine	developed	 by	 the	 CJEU.63	 Following	 the	 European	 Communities	declaration:	 “[t]he	 Protocol	 […]	 shall	 apply,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	competences	transferred	to	the	Union,	to	the	territories	in	which	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	is	applied	and	under	 the	 conditions	 laid	 down	 in	 that	 Treaty.”64	 Since	 the	Directive	 91/477/EEC	 did	 not	 fulfill	 all	 requirements	 of	 the	 UN	Protocol,	 the	 Commission	 proposed	 an	 amendment	 to	 the	Directive.	A	proposal	to	amend	Directive	91/477/EEC	was	drafted	by	 the	Commission	 in	2006.65	 Interestingly,	Member	States	with	huge	arm	exporting	corporations	in	the	EU,	such	as	Germany	and	the	 United	 Kingdom,	 have	 not	 ratified	 the	 UN	 Protocol	 until	today,66	 however,	 they	 are	 bound	 by	 the	 EU	 Directive,	 which	implements	the	UN	Protocol.	2.	 The	Substantive	Changes	of	the	Directive	The	improved	functioning	of	the	European	Firearms	Pass	and	the	enhanced	exchange	of	information	between	the	Member	States	are	the	two	major	objectives	of	the	new	Directive	from	an	intra-EU	perspective.	 As	 acknowledged	 in	 Directive	 2008/51/EC,	 the	European	 Firearms	 Pass	 “functions	 in	 a	 satisfactory	 way.”67	However,	 there	was	 room	 for	 improvement	 in	 terms	 of	 hunters	and	marksmen,	 as	 the	 Commission	 pointed	 out.68	 The	 Directive	further	points	to	the	enhanced	exchange	of	information	between	Member	States	 to	combat	 illicit	 trafficking	and	manufacturing	of	
                                                        62.	 Id.	63.	 See	generally	Smith,	supra	note	56.	64.	 Protocol	Against	 the	 Illicit	Manufacturing	of	and	Trafficking	 in	Firearms,	Their	Parts	 and	 Components	 and	 Ammunition,	 July	 11,	 2001,	 2326	 U.N.T.S.	 208	 [hereinafter	Protocol	Against	Illicit	Manufacturing].	65.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	250.	66.	 Protocol	Against	Illicit	Manufacturing,	supra	note	64.		67.	 Directive	2008/51/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	21	May	2008,	supra	note	7,	Recital	14.	68.	 European	 Commission,	 Evaluation	 of	 Council	 Directive	 91/477/EC	 of	 18	 June	1991,	as	amended	by	Directive	2008/51/EC	of	21	May	2008,	on	Control	of	the	Acquisition	and	Possession	of	Weapons	at	18,	COM	(2015)	751	final.		
868	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	firearms,	which	is	envisaged	under	the	new	Directive.69	From	the	external	 perspective,	 the	 new	 Directive	 had	 to	 comply	with	 the	newly	 signed	 UN	 Protocol.	 The	 Directive	 further	 provides	 that	“[t]he	 accession	 of	 the	 Community	 to	 the	 Protocol	 requires	amendments	 to	 certain	 provisions	 of	 Directive	 91/477/EEC.”70	The	 Protocol’s	 main	 objective	 is	 the	 decrease	 of	 the	 illicit	manufacturing	 and	 trafficking	 of	 arms.71	 Therefore,	 “[t]he	 2008	amendments	 expand	 the	 scope	 of	 Directive	 91/477/EEC,	 now	addressing	such	issues	as	illicit	manufacturing	and	trafficking.”72	First,	the	Directive	2008/51/EC	now	also	includes	the	notion	of	 convertible	 firearms,	which	had	been	a	prevalent	 concern	 for	national	 police	 authorities.	 The	 Directive	 states	 in	 this	 regard,	“[p]olice	 intelligence	 evidence	 shows	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 use	 of	converted	weapons	within	the	Community.	It	is	therefore	essential	to	ensure	 that	 such	convertible	weapons	are	brought	within	 the	definition	 of	 a	 firearm	 […].”73	 This	 measure	 transposes	 the	requirements	 from	 the	 UN	 Protocol	 into	 Community	 law.	Moreover,	 it	 “[p]rovides	 for	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 regulatory	response	to	illicit	manufacturing,	as	converted	weapons	are	easily	‘re-manufactured’	 from	 readily	 available	 firearm	 component	parts.”74	Second,	the	Directive	also	calls	for	the	marking	of	firearms	directly	after	manufacturing.	The	Directive	further	clarifies,	“[t]he	Protocol	establishes	an	obligation	to	mark	weapons	at	the	time	of	manufacture	 […].”75	By	 this	measure,	 the	Directive	aims	 to	get	 a	grip	 on	 the	 illicit	manufacturing	 of	 firearms.	 “If	 a	 firearm	 is	 not	marked,	 the	 Member	 State	 must	 ensure	 that	 the	 firearm	 is	deactivated.”76	In	the	area	of	enhanced	cooperation,	the	Directive	called	 for	a	computerized	data-filling	system	 to	which	authorized	authorities	are	granted	access	and	the	setting	up	of	a	contact	group	
                                                        69.	 Directive	2008/51/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	21	May	2008,	supra	note	7,	Recital	15.		70.	 Id.	Recital	3.	71.	 Protocol	Against	the	Illicit	Manufacturing	of	and	Trafficking	 in	Firearms,	supra	note,	14.	72.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	255.	73.	 Directive	2008/51/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	21	May	2008,	supra	note	7,	Recital	4.			74.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	256.	75.	 Directive	2008/51/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	21	May	2008,	supra	note	7,	Recital	7.		76.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	256-57.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 869	for	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 among	 the	 Member	 States.77	Finally,	 the	 Directive	 brought	 new	 minimum	 requirements	 in	relation	 to	 entities	 involved	 in	 firearm	 sales	 of	 transfer	 and	persons	who	are	eligible	to	acquire	a	firearm.78	The	legal	basis	for	the	 Directive	 did	 not	 change,	 as	 the	 Commission	 still	 used	 the	approximation	of	laws	Article,	at	that	time	the	re-named	Article	95	of	the	TEC	Treaty.79	3.	 The	Wider	Ramifications	of	the	Directive	The	new	Directive	brought	major	changes	and	a	tightening	of	firearms	 regulation	 in	 the	 European	 Community.	 Visibly,	 the	minimum	 requirements	 of	 firearm	 legislation	 in	 the	 Community	had	 been	 heightened.	 Therefore,	 the	 process	 of	 adopting	 the	Directive	 in	 the	 Council	 was	 marked	 by	 intensive	 discussions	between	the	Member	States.	“Austria	and	Finland	abstained	from	voting	in	the	Council	during	the	adoption	of	the	Firearms	Directive	2008/51/EC,	as	it	tightened	the	gun	control	law	and	imposed	the	introduction	 of	 a	 national	 register	 of	 firearms.”80	 Especially	 for	Austria,	which	has	many	 firearm	holders,	 the	 implementation	of	Directive	 2008/51/EC	 proved	 to	 be	 an	 administrative	 and	 legal	challenge.81	Due	to	the	co-decision	procedure	adopted	pursuant	to	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	the	Directive	had	to	be	also	adopted	by	the	Parliament.	Remarkably,	some	members	of	the	Parliament	wanted	to	 push	 further	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	 illicit	 firearms.82	 However,	opposition	 in	 the	 Council	 and	 in	 the	 Parliament	 stopped	 this	process,	and	the	Directive	was	adopted	with	minor	amendments	in	the	first	reading	in	the	Parliament.83	The	success	or	failure	of	the	amended	Directive,	in	light	of	the	market	for	illicit	firearms,	is	strongly	debated.	Scholars	argue	that	the	Directive	was	a	failure	with	regard	to	illicit	firearms	trafficking,	since	 the	 European	 Community	 lacked	 the	 competences	 to	
                                                        77.	 Id.	at	261.		78.	 Id.	at	247.	79.	 Treaty	 of	 Nice,	 Amending	 the	 Treaty	 on	 European	 Union,	 the	 Treaties	Establishing	 the	 European	 Communities	 and	 Certain	Related	Acts	 art.	 95,	Oct.	 3,	 2001,	2001	O.J.	(C80)	1.		80.	 Brigitte	Pircher,	Member	States’	Opposition	in	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	
and	its	Impacts	on	the	Implementation	of	Directives,	46	OZP	1,	5	(2017).	81.	 Id.	82.	 Tessman,	supra	note	10,	at	259.	83.	 Eur.	Parl.	Doc.	(COM	C6-0081/2006)	(2006).	
870	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	efficiently	 tackle	 the	 issue	of	 illicit	 firearms	 trade.84	As	Tessman	writes,	“[t]he	complex	political	nature	of	the	European	Union	[at	that	 time]	 may	 render	 a	 single,	 effective	 legislative	 response	unattainable.”85	 In	 conclusion,	 the	 Directive	 significantly	heightened	the	floor	of	firearms	legislation	in	the	European	Union.	Thus,	 bringing	 the	 firearms	 legislation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	towards	 a	 more	 unified	 standard,	 and	 therefore,	 enhancing	 the	intra-EU	trade	of	firearms.	
C.	 Council	Directive	2017/853	–	The	European	Agenda	on	
Security	in	the	Aftermath	of	the	Paris	and	Copenhagen	Terrorist	
Attacks	The	last	legislative	act	in	the	area	of	firearms	legislation	by	the	European	Union	 is	 Council	Directive	 2017/853,	which	 amended	the	 two	 previous	 Directives.	 The	 most	 crucial	 aspect	 of	 the	Directive,	 preventing	 and	 fighting	 terrorist	 attacks	 in	 the	 EU,	 is	directly	visible	at	the	beginning	of	the	Directive.	“Certain	aspects	of	 Directive	 97/477/EEC	 need	 to	 be	 further	 improved	 in	 a	proportionate	way,	in	order	to	address	the	misuse	of	firearms	for	criminal	 purposes,	 and	 considering	 recent	 terrorist	 acts.”86	 In	contrast	 to	 its	 two	 predecessors,	 Directive	 2017/853	 was	prompted	by	terrorist	acts	in	the	Member	States,	namely	in	Paris	and	Copenhagen.	87	Both	attacks	had	been	carried	out,	respectively,	by	 illicitly	 reactivated	 firearms	 and	 illicitly	 acquired	 firearms.88	The	Communication	by	the	Commission	on	‘The	European	Agenda	
                                                        84.	 Tessman,	supra	note	12,	at	238.			85.	 Id.	at	264.	86.	 Directive	2017/853	of	 the	European	Parliament	 and	of	 the	Council	 of	 17	May	2017	 and	 Amending	 Council	 Directive	 91/477/EEC	 on	 Control	 of	 the	 Acquisition	 and	Possession	 of	 Weapons,	 Recital	 2,	 2017	 O.J.	 (L	 137/22)	 (EC)	 [hereinafter	 Amending	Directive].	87.	 Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	the	Committee	of	the	Regions,	supra	note	3,	at	17.		88.	 Jason	Burke,	Military	Grade	Firearms	Increasingly	Available	to	Terrorists	in	Europe	
-	 Report,	 GUARDIAN	 (Apr.	 18,	 2018),	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/18/arms-race-criminal-gangs-helping-terrorists-get-weapons-report-warns	 [perma.cc/5ZTF-UEHB];	 Peter	 Krogh	 Andersen,	
Terrorangreb	i	København:	Gerningsvåben	stammer	fra	et	hjemmerøveri,	DR	(Feb.	8,	2015),	https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/terrorangreb-i-koebenhavn-gerningsvaaben-stammer-fra-et-hjemmeroeveri	 [perma.cc/K24M-873V];	 Policy-makers	 and	 citizens	
criticize	the	proposed	revision	of	the	European	Firearms	Directive,	EUROPEAN	FEDERATION	OF	ASSOCIATIONS	FOR	HUNTING	&	CONSERVATION	(2016)	[hereinafter	FACE]		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 871	on	 Security’	 points	 out,	 “[r]ecent	 terrorist	 attacks	 have	 focused	attention	on	how	organized	criminals	are	able	to	access	and	trade	firearms	 in	 Europe,	 even	 military	 grade	 firearms,	 in	 large	numbers.”89	The	new	Directive	falls	into	the	latest	legal	framework	of	 European	 integration,	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	 which	 created	 the	European	 Union	 as	 it	 is	 known	 today	 since	 2009.90	 The	 Lisbon	Treaty,	 as	 a	 highly	 ambitious	 treaty,	 gives	 the	 EU	 wide	competences	in	many	policy	areas	and	enhances	the	power	of	the	federal	lawmaker.	1.	 The	Way	Leading	to	the	Directive	The	Commission	acknowledged	weaknesses	in	the	two	earlier	Directives	 in	 the	 REFIT	 Report	 from	 2015.91	 In	 its	 report,	 the	Commission	 lamented	 the	 absence	 of	 disaggregated	 data	 on	firearms	circulating	in	the	European	Union,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	comparable	data	on	trends	in	criminal	acts	 involving	firearms	in	the	European	Union.92	The	REFIT	report	also	underlined	that	the	implementing	 process	 by	 the	 Member	 States	 has	 demonstrated	several	inconsistencies	and	also	revealed	its	very	limited	impact	to	counter	 illicit	 firearms	 trafficking	 in	 the	 European	Union.93	 This	corresponds	 to	 Member	 States’	 experiences,	 which	 have	 shown	that	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Directives	 concerning	 firearm	minimum	 standards	 has	 proven	 to	 be	 an	 obstacle	 in	 certain	Member	States,	which	have	a	high	number	of	firearms	fluctuating	in	the	society.94	The	implementation	of	the	measures,	as	well	as	the	immediate	threat	of	terrorist	acts	committed	with	illicit	firearms,	prompted	the	Commission	to	draft	a	new	legislative	intervention	in	the	area	of	firearms	legislation.95	
                                                        89.	 The	European	Agenda,	supra	note	3,	at	17.		90.	 Treaty	of	Lisbon,	supra	note	16,	art.	6.			91.	 TECHNOPOLIS	ET	AL.,	EUROPEAN	COMMISSION	EVALUATION	OF	THE	FIREARMS	DIRECTIVE	-	FINAL	REPORT	(European	Commission	Directorate-General	for	Enterprise	and	Industry	ed.,	Dec.	2014).		92.	 Christian	Ponti,	An	Appraisal	of	 the	European	Union	Legal	Framework	on	 Illicit	
Firearms	 Trafficking	 after	 Directive	 2017/853/EU,	 4	 RIVISTA	 DI	 STUDI	 E	 RICHERCHE	 SULLA	CRIMINALITÁ	ORGANIZZATA	13,	20-21	(2018).		93.	 Id.	at	21.		94.	 Pircher,	supra	note	80,	at	5.		95.	 Ponti,	supra	note	92,	at	22.	
872	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	2.	 The	Substantive	Changes	of	the	Directive	With	 the	 two	 aforementioned	 objectives,	 this	 ambitious	Directive	has	a	strong	focus	on	security.96	Nevertheless,	the	legal	basis	 for	 the	 Directive	 remained	 Article	 114	 of	 the	 TFEU,	 the	renamed	Article	95.	With	the	aim	of	providing	the	means	for	the	approximation	 of	 laws	 to	 achieve	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 single	market.97	The	strong	security	focus	of	the	Directive,	drafted	on	the	legal	basis	of	achieving	a	frictionless	market,	might	raise	concerns	on	whether	 the	wide	 scope	of	 the	Directive	 is	overzealous.	That	being	 said,	 the	 Directive	 explains,	 “[i]n	 accordance	 with	 the	principle	of	proportionality,	[…],	this	Directive	does	not	go	beyond	what	is	necessary	in	order	to	achieve	those	objectives.”98	Further,	the	respect	for	the	principle	of	subsidiarity,	which	is	a	fundamental	principle	 of	 EU	 lawmaking,	 is	 acknowledged	 in	 the	 same	paragraph,	 pointing	 out	 that	 “[t]he	 objectives	 of	 this	 Directive	cannot	be	sufficiently	achieved	by	the	Member	States,	[…].”99	With	this	 hedging	 against	 possible	 accusations	 of	 not	 respecting	 the	principles	of	 lawmaking	 in	 the	European	Union,	 the	Commission	wisely	 took	 into	 account	 possible	 confrontational	 caveats	 by	critical	Member	States.	In	 terms	 of	 its	 content,	 the	 Directive	 moves	 the	 ‘most	dangerous’	 semi-automatic	 firearms	 from	 category	 B	 (firearms	subject	to	authorization)	to	category	A.	These	firearms	will	not	be	allowed	 to	 be	 held	 by	 private	 persons,	 even	 if	 they	 have	 been	permanently	deactivated.100	Further,	 the	Directive	“[a]ims	[…]	 to	better	 harmonize	 Member	 States’	 legislation	 on	 the	 marking	 of	firearms	 which,	 […],	 was	 lacking	 in	 uniformity	 and	 facilitated	criminals	in	illegally	trading	weapons	parts	or	illicitly	reactivating	firearms.”101	 An	 even	 more	 important	 point	 in	 this	 tightened	approach	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 Commission	 to	 adopt	implementing	acts,	which	are	binding	on	the	Member	States	and	self-executive.102	By	this	measure,	the	Commission	aims	to	achieve	
                                                        96.	 Id.	at	22-23.	97.	 Treaty	of	Lisbon,	supra	note	16,	art.	114.	at	94-95.	98.	 Amending	Directive,	supra	note	86,	at	Recital	33.	99.	 Id.	100.	 Ponti,	supra	note	92,	at	24.	101.	 Id.		102.	 Jürgen	 Bast,	 New	 Categories	 of	 Acts	 after	 the	 Lisbon	 Reform:	 Dynamics	 of	
Parliamentarization	in	EU	Law,	49	COMMON	MKT.	L.	REV.	885,	908	(2012).			
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 873	a	true	common	standard	in	the	field	of	marking	of	firearms,	since	implementation	 in	 the	 Member	 States	 has	 proven	 difficult.	Whereas	 before	 certain	 standards	 of	marking	 of	 firearms	 in	 the	different	 Member	 States	 deviated,	 the	 new	 Directive	 aims	 to	harmonize	 even	 at	 the	 lower	 levels	 of	 Member	 States’	administration.103	 This	 shift	 of	 competences	 is	 clearly	acknowledged	in	the	new	Directive.104	Another	 point	 of	 concern	 was	 the	 reactivation	 of	 firearms	since	 this	 technique	 has	 been	 used	 to	 acquire	 firearms	 for	 the	terrorist	attacks	in	Paris.105	The	Commission	addressed	that	point	in	 the	 new	 Firearms	 Directive.106	 Consequently,	 Directive	2017/853	sets	out	a	very	comprehensive	regulation	of	converted	firearms.	 “National	 registers	 must	 keep	 records	 of	 deactivated	firearms	 and	 their	 owners.”107	 Deactivated	 firearms	 are	 now	within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Firearms	 Directive,	 as	 they	 must	 be	classified	as	category	C	firearms	(firearms	and	weapons	subject	to	declaration).108	 Further,	 “[t]he	 European	 Commission	 has	prepared	 a	 proposal	 package	 that	 sets	 out	 rigorous	 and	harmonized	standards	criteria	how	Member	States	shall	include	in	their	National	Firearms	Acts	the	deactivation	criteria	for	firearms	to	 become	 unfit	 for	 use	 as	 a	 firearms.”109	 This	 was	 a	 small	legislative	step	but	attached	with	high	administrative	cost	for	the	Member	States	since	deactivated,	and	even	acoustic	firearms	have	to	be	accurately	tracked	under	the	new	Directive.110	
                                                        103.	 Parliament	and	Council	Regulation	182/2011	of	Feb.	16	2011,	Laying	Down	the	Rules	and	General	Principles	Concerning	Mechanisms	for	Control	by	Member	States	of	the	Commission’s	Exercise	of	Implementing	Powers	2011	O.J.(	L	55)	13.	104.	 “In	order	to	ensure	uniform	conditions	for	the	implementation	of	this	Directive,	implementing	powers	should	be	conferred	on	the	Commission.”	Amending	Directive,	supra	note	86,	Recital	30.	105.	 Burke,	supra	note	88.		106.	 “The	European	Commission’s	package	of	measure	 to	 tighten	 firearms	control	also	includes	an	implementing	regulation	laying	down	common	minimum	standards	for	the	 deactivation	 of	 firearms,	 which	 make	 re-activation	 much	 more	 difficult	 in	 case	 of	deactivated	firearms.”	Csaba	Szabó,	Examination	of	the	Need	for	a	Directive	to	Strengthen	
the	 Control	 Over	 Possession	 of	 Firearms	 Envisaged	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 in	 the	
Context	of	New	Types	of	Security	Challenges	Affecting	the	European	Union,	13	HADMÉRNÖK	3,	486,	492	(2018).		107.	 Ponti,	supra	note	92,	at	28.		108.	 Amending	Directive,	supra	note	86,	at	37.		109.	 Szabó,	supra	note	106,	at	492.	110.	 Amending	Directive,	supra	note	86,	at	37-8.	
874	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	3.	 The	Legislative	Backdrop	of	the	Directive	From	 the	 start,	 the	 Directive	 was	 under	 critics	 by	 many	stakeholders.	 From	 a	 policy-making	 point	 of	 view,	 strong	criticisms	 have	 been	 raised	 with	 regard	 to	 lacking	 impact	assessment	before	drafting	 the	proposal	of	 the	new	Directive.111	Instead,	the	EU	lawmaker	took	into	account	the	REFIT	report.	The	report	was	not	specifically	intended	as	assessment	in	light	of	a	new	legislative	reform	but	rather	as	a	general	audit	of	the	impact	of	the	Directive.112	 Further,	 critics	 in	 the	 Parliament	 focused	 on	 the	subsidiarity	principle	of	the	EU,	which	is	enshrined	in	Article	5(3)	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	(hereinafter	“TEU”).113	“[M]EPs	rejected	 the	 Commission’s	 proposal	 recalling	 the	 subsidiarity	principle,	 which	 enables	 Member	 States	 to	 adopt	 legislation	tailored	 to	 national	 requirements.”114	 While	 the	 precedent	Directives	 on	 firearms	 legislation	 faced	 critics	 by	 stakeholders,	Council	 Directive	 2017/853	was	 under	 immense	 criticism	 from	many	sides.115	During	the	legislative	process	of	adopting	the	Directive,	many	members	of	national	parliaments	and	of	the	EU	Parliament	were	under	 pressure	 from	 lobbying	 organizations.	 This	 has	 been	highlighted	 especially	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 in	 which	 arms	producers	 opposed	 the	 Directive.116	 Social	 science	 “[r]esearch	showed	 that	 opinions	 are	 shared	 among	 the	 members	 of	parliament,	 the	 government	 and	 interest	 groups	 regarding	 the	implementation	of	this	Directive	in	Czech	legislation,	[…].”117	Czech	firearm	producers	had	a	lot	at	stake	with	the	implementation	of	the	Directive.	 Namely,	 Czech	 firearms	 producers	 such	 as	 Česká	zbrojovka	 or	 Sellier	 &	 Bellot	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 the	tightened	 approach	 towards	 firearm	 possession	 and	
                                                        111.	 See	FACE,	supra	note	88.		112.	 Parliament	&	Council,	Directive	2008/51/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	 Council	 amending	 Council	 Directive	 91/477/EEC	 on	 control	 of	 the	 acquisition	 and	possession	of	weapons	see	Article	17.	2008.	113.	 See	FACE,	supra	note	88.	114.	 Id.	115.	 Id.		116.	 Katerina	Bočková	et	al.,	Lobbying	Activities	in	Relation	to	the	Implementation	of	
EU	 Directive	 91/477/EEC	 on	 Control	 and	 Acquisition	 of	 Weapons,	 6	 FORUM	 SCIENTIAE	OECONOMIA	91,	98	(2018).		117.	 Id.	at	91.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 875	manufacturing.118	 Therefore,	 they	 opposed	 the	 Directive	 via	industry	 associations,	 a	 process	 widely	 popular	 in	 EU	lawmaking.119	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Directive	 was	 accepted	 by	 the	Parliament	on	March	14,	2017,	and	adopted	in	the	Council	on	April	25,	2017,	against	the	rejections	from	the	Czech	Republic,	Poland,	and	Luxembourg.120	Interestingly,	Poland	and	the	Czech	Republic	regarded	 the	 Directive	 as	 too	 strict	 in	 its	 legislative	 approach	towards	firearms,	whereas	Luxembourg	rejected	the	Directive	as	it	 considered	 as	 too	weak	 to	 efficiently	 tackle	 the	 possession	 of	illicit	firearms.121	4.	 The	Litigation	Consequences	of	the	Directive	In	2017,	after	 the	Directive	was	adopted	 in	 the	Council,	 the	Czech	Republic—as	being	an	outvoted	Member	State—decided	to	bring	 a	 case	 in	 front	 of	 the	 CJEU,	 claiming	 the	 invalidity	 of	 the	relevant	 Directive.	 “[t]he	 Government	 of	 the	 Czech	 Republic	instructed	the	Minister	of	the	Interior	to	submit	an	analysis	of	the	legislative	impact	of	Directive	91/477/EEC	to	the	Government	[…].	This	 analysis	 was	 also	 prepared	 taking	 into	 account	 the	proceedings	 of	 the	 Czech	 action	 at	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	European	Union	regarding	the	invalidity	of	this	Directive.”122	The	critic	was	shared	by	Poland,	which	rejected	the	Directive	alongside	the	 Czech	 Republic	 in	 the	 Council.123	 Pursuant	 to	 Poland,	 “[t]he	new	solutions	are	excessive,	too	harsh	and	not	always	rational.”124	Subsequently,	Poland	intervened	on	the	side	of	the	Czech	Republic	at	the	CJEU.	Notably,	the	current	Polish	government	is	at	the	same	
                                                        118.	 Sellier	&	Bellot	(Company	profile),	European	Foundation	for	the	Improvement	of	Living	and	Working	Conditions	(Eurofund)(2020).	119.	 Bočková,	et	al.,	supra	note	116,	at	98.		120.	 Press	Release,	Ministry	of	 the	 Interior	and	Administration	of	The	Republic	of	Poland,	A	Reponse	to	a	Multiple	Petition	Regarding	a	Case	by	Republic	of	Poland	to	European	
Tribunal	of	Justice	Against	European	Parliament	Directive	91/477/EEC	On	the	Control	of	the	
Acquisition	and	Possession	of	Weapons	(Oct.	6,	2017).		121.	 Aline	 Robert,	 EU	 States	 Reach	 Difficult	 Compromise	 on	 Firearms,	 EURACTIV	FRANCE	 (Dec.	 21,	 2016)	 https://www.euractiv.com/section/security/news/eu-states-reach-difficult-compromise-on-firearms/	[https://perma.cc/NAQ2-Y7ZB].	122.	 Bočková,	et	al.,	supra	note	116,	at	99.	123.	 Press	Release,	supra	note	120.	124.	 Id.	
876	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	time	 in	 an	 ongoing	 judicial	 battle	 with	 the	 European	 Union	regarding	its	overhaul	of	the	national	judiciary.125	
D.	 Conclusion	European	 harmonization	 in	 the	 field	 of	 firearms	 legislation	has	 come	 from	 a	minimum-standard	 approach,	 given	 the	 initial	implementation	 of	 the	 single	 market,	 to	 a	 restrictive	 standard,	comprehensively	covering	all	kinds	of	“portable	barreled	weapons	
that	expel	projectiles	by	the	action	of	a	combustible	propellant.”126	The	 history	 of	 harmonization	 in	 the	 field	 of	 firearms	 in	 the	European	Union	is	a	history	that	finds	many	precedents	in	other	policy	 fields,	 such	 as	 the	 regulation	 of	 tobacco	 or	 consumer	products.	The	Union	is	inevitably	on	its	way	to	“lay	the	foundations	of	an	ever-closer	union	among	the	peoples	of	Europe.”127	This	ever-closer	union	requires	harmonization	of	legislation	in	various	fields.	Among	them,	the	alignment	of	firearms	regulation	in	the	Member	States.	The	legislative	history	of	the	regulation	of	firearms	has	to	be	seen	through	the	lens	of	the	expanding	of	competences	of	the	Union	via	the	subsequent	treaty	revisions.	Therefore,	the	history	of	progression	 in	 firearms	 regulation	 is	 a	 history	 of	 European	integration.	As	of	today,	some	scholars	argue	for	an	even	tighter	approach	to	 firearms	 legislation,	 given	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 current	legislation	 and	 future	 security	 threats.128	 Ponti	 notes,	 that	“[n]otwithstanding	 this	 undeniable	 process,	 the	 EU	 still	 lacks	 a	legislative	 policy	 to	 fight	 all	 aspects	 of	 IFT	 [Illicit	 Firearms	Trafficking]	comprehensively.	In	particular,	it	would	be	desirable	to	 introduce	 further	 legislative	 intervention	with	 the	purpose	of	effectively	harmonizing	Member	States’	substantive	criminal	 law	
                                                        125.	 Niels	Kirst,	The	Independence	of	Judges	in	Polish’s	Courts:	the	CJEU	Judgement	in	
Commission	v	Poland	(C-192/18),	DUBLIN	CITY	UNIVERSITY	BREXIT	INSTITUTE	(Nov.	19,	2019),	http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2019/11/the-independence-of-judges-in-polishs-courts-the-cjeu-judgement-in-commission-v-poland-c-192-18/	[perma.cc/ZB2H-T9LX].	126.	 Parliament	&	Council,	Directive	2017/853	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	 Council	 amending	 Council	 Directive	 91/477/EEC	 on	 control	 of	 the	 acquisition	 and	possession	of	weapons	see	Article	1.	2017.	127.	 Consolidated	Version	of	 the	Treaty	on	European	Union	Preamble,	2010	O.J.	C	83/01,	at	16.		128.	 Doris	 Kiendl,	 Security	 Issues	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 in	 the	 Light	 of	 Current	Developments		(A.	V.	Akulshina	ed.,	Scientific	Advisor		2019).	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 877	on	 IFT	 (common	 definitions	 on	 offences	 and	 penalties),	 […].”129	Other	scholars	point	to	the	risk	of	harming	other	Union	objectives	by	over-harmonizing	in	the	field	of	firearms	regulation.	“It	should	be	noted	that	the	regulation	may	adversely	affect	the	conditions	of	competition	both	within	the	internal	market	and	the	international	market	 in	 a	 number	 of	 professional	 and	 economic	 fields	 closely	linked	to	the	legal	possession	of	firearms	(pushing	back	the	online	trade;	 weapons-related	 cultural	 heritage;	 historical	 weapon	collection;	research	in	connection	with	firearms;	paid	hunting).”130	In	 conclusion,	 there	 is	 no	 prevailing	 opinion	 on	 the	 future	 of	firearms	 legislation	 in	 the	 European	 Union,	 while	 the	 majority	agree	 with	 the	 aims	 already	 achieved	 by	 the	 three	 consecutive	Directives,	 and	 some	 minority	 voices	 criticize	 an	 over-harmonization.	The	 following	 Part	 III	 of	 this	 Article	 analyses	 the	 CJEU’s	judgement	in	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council	(C-482/17).	Beforehand,	as	a	measure	to	enhance	the	overview	of	the	previous	firearms	 legislation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 to	 highlight	 the	differences	 between	 the	 three	 consecutive	 Directives,	 the	following	table	is	proposed:																
                                                        129.	 Ponti,	supra	note	92,	at	31.		130.	 Szabó,	supra	note	106,	at	493.	
878	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	Table	 1:	 Schematic	 overview	 of	 the	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	three	 consecutive	 Directives	 on	 firearms	 regulation	 in	 the	European	Union	
	 Stage	of	
European	
Integration	
Main	reason	for	
the	legislative	
amendment	
Legal	basis	
for	the	
Directive	
Procedure	of	
adopting	the	
Directive	
Main	
objective	of	
the	Directive	
Directive	
91/477/	
EEC	
European	Communities	 Establishment	of	the	Single	Market	and	the	Schengen	Agreement	
Article	100	A	TEC	(Internal	Market	competence)	
Cooperation	procedure	(opinion	by	the	European	Parliament)	
Mutual	confidence	in	security	among	the	Member	States	
Directive	
2008/51/E
C	
European	Community	 Signing	of	the	UN	Protocol	 Article	95	(1)	EC	Treaty	(Internal	Market	competence)	
Co-decision	procedure	(vote	in	the	European	Parliament)	
Implementing	the	UN	Protocol	against	the	Illicit	Manufacturing	of	and	Trafficking	in	Firearms	
Directive	
2017/853	
European	Union	 Terrorist	attacks	in	Paris	and	Copenhagen	 Article	114	TFEU	(Internal	Market	competence)	
Ordinary	legislative	procedure	(vote	in	the	European	Parliament)	
Tighten	the	grip	on	illicit	firearms	ownership	in	the	European	Union		
III.	 DISCUSSION	ON	CZECH	REPUBLIC	V	PARLIAMENT	AND	
COUNCIL	–	CHALLENGE	OF	THE	FIREARMS	DIRECTIVE	AT	THE	
COURT	OF	JUSTICE	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION		First	(an	obvious	point):	firearms	are	intrinsically	dangerous	goods.	They	give	rise	to	safety	concerns	not	only	for	their	users	but	 for	 the	 wider	 public.	 That	 is	 why	 the	 legislature	 has	introduced	 […]	 provisions	 that	 restrict	 the	 possession	 and	acquisition	of	such	weapons.131		Advocate	General	Sharpston	in	her	Opinion	in	Czech	Republic	
v	Parliament	and	Council.	Rebutting	the	argument	of	the	Czech	Republic	 that	 the	 European	Union	may	 only	 regulate	 in	 the	internal	market	regarding	the	safety	of	the	user	of	products.			
                                                        131.	 See	Case	C-482/17,	supra	note	2.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 879	After	having	described	the	history	of	firearms	legislation	on	the	European	level,	Part	III	of	the	article	provides	an	overview	of	the	Case	Czech	Republic	 v	 Parliament	 and	Council	 (C-482/17).	 In	this	case,	the	Czech	Republic	contested	the	legal	basis	of	the	latest	version	of	 the	Firearms	Directive.	 The	question,	which	 the	CJEU	quintessentially	had	to	answer	was	 if	Article	114	TFEU	provides	for	the	competence	to	enact	security	legislation	of	the	EU.	
A.	 Background	of	the	Case	On	December	3,	2019,	the	CJEU	gave	its	final	verdict	on	the	so-called	 Czech	 firearms	 case.132	 In	 this	 judgment,	 which	 gives	guidance	 on	 the	 lawmaking	 in	 the	 European	 Union,	 the	 CJEU	touched	on	many	principles	of	EU	law	and	refined	their	meaning.	The	European	legislature	used	its	mandate	for	the	single	market	to	amend	 the	 previous	 Firearms	 Directive	 2008/51/EC133	 and	Council	 Directive	 91/477/EEC,134	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 terrorist	attacks	in	Paris135	and	Copenhagen.136	The	initial	proposal	of	the	Commission	 gained	 steam	 under	 the	 Dutch	 presidency	 of	 the	Council	 in	 2016.	 Finally,	 the	 Directive	 underwent	 the	 Trialogue	process	 before	 being	 approved	 according	 to	 the	 co-decision	procedure	 by	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council.	 The	 Parliament	approved	 the	 amended	 Directive	 on	 March	 14,	 2017,	 while	 the	Council	 followed	 suit	 on	 April	 25,	 2017,	 with	 only	 the	 Czech	Republic,	 Poland	 and	 Luxembourg	 disagreeing.	 While	 Poland	voted	against	the	Directive,	due	to	stringent	norms,	Luxembourg	voted	against	the	Directive	since	it	wanted	a	stronger	regulation	of	firearms.137	 Critical	 voices	 on	 political	 participation	 and	accountability	 accompanied	 the	 legislative	 process	 of	 the	Directive.138	There	 is	a	specific	prehistory	to	the	case.	After	the	terrorist	attacks	in	Paris	and	Copenhagen,	the	Juncker	Commission	decided	to	tighten	the	gun	laws	in	the	European	Union.139	This	was	met	by	
                                                        132.	 Id.	art.	5.	133.	 Directive	2008/51/EC,	supra	note	7.	134.	 See	Council	Directive	91/477/EEC,	supra	note	7.	135.	 See	Hollande,	supra	note	1.	136.	 See	Andersen,	supra	note	88.	137.	 Robert,	supra	note	121.	138.	 See	FACE,	supra	note	88.		139.	 DG	HOME,	Agreement	on	Commission	Proposal	 to	 Increase	Citizens’	 Security	(Directorate	General	Migration	and	Home	Affairs)	(Dec.	21,	2016).	
880	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	much	 skepticism	on	 the	Czech	 side.140	The	Czech	Republic’s	 gun	laws	 differed	 tremendously	 from	 those	 of	 most	 other	 Member	States	of	the	European	Union.	The	history	of	liberal	gun	possession	in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 stretches	 back	 to	 the	 18th	 century.141	Further,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 had	 a	 flourishing	 armament	industry.142	 The	 Czech	 Republic	 had	 specifically	 harsh	 aversion	towards	the	Directive	since	civilian	firearm	ownership	has	a	long	tradition	 in	the	Czech	Republic,143	and	the	Czech	government,	as	well	as	Czech	civil	society	groups,	feared	severe	consequences	for	the	Czech	economy	and	the	Czech	cultural	heritage.144	Therefore,	the	Czech	Republic	had	a	 great	 interest	 to	oppose	 the	Directive,	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	Czech	Republic	is	the	seventh-largest	post-war	arm	exporter	in	the	world.145	After	 being	 outvoted	 in	 Parliament	 and	 Council,	 the	 Czech	Government	decided	to	challenge	the	Directive	at	the	CJEU.146	The	Czech	 Republic	 alleged	 a	 breach	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 conferral	 of	powers	 (Article	 5(2)	 TEU),	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality	(Article	5(4)	TEU),	of	the	principle	of	legal	certainty	and	protection	of	 legitimate	 expectations	 and	 finally,	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 non-discrimination.147	 The	 Czech	Republic,	 supported	 by	 Poland	 and	Hungary	in	its	claim,	fired	full	blast	to	protect	its	political	interest	in	 front	of	 the	CJEU.148	The	case	 is	 interesting	 for	 three	 reasons.	First,	the	case	deals	with	the	question	of	legal	basis	under	Article	114	TFEU	and	has	therefore	gained	significant	attention	from	EU	lawyers.	Second,	it	is	yet	another	case	in	which	the	Czech	Republic	
                                                        140.	 Euractive,	EU	Gun	Control	Push	Undermines	Trust	in	EU,	Czech	Minister	Claims,	EURACTIVE	 (Aug.	 10,	 2017)	 https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/eu-gun-control-push-undermines-trust-in-eu-czech-minister-claims/	 [https://perma.cc/5YYV-7DZA].	141.	 David	W.	Cerny,	Jan	Lopaka,	and	Gabriela	Baczynska,	Gun	Culture	in	the	Czech	
Republic,	REUTERS	(June	9,	2016),	https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/gun-culture-in-the-czech-republic	[https://perma.cc/PT5A-RRHK]	.	142.	 Martin	Hrobsky,	The	Defense	Industry	in	the	Czech	Republic,	CZECH	RADIO	(Nov.	28,	 2002),	 https://www.radio.cz/en/section/economic/the-defense-industry-in-the-czech-
republic	[https://perma.cc/5QLR-AGTG].	143.	 Cerny,	supra	note	142.	144.	 Euractive	2017,	supra	note	140.	145.	 Martin	 Armstrong,	 The	 World’s	 Biggest	 Postwar	 Arms	 Exporters,	 STATISTA		(2018)	 https://www.statista.com/chart/13205/the-worlds-biggest-postwar-arms-exporters/ 
[https://perma.cc/6SXT-WEPE].	146.	 Euractive	2017,	supra	note	140.	Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	2.	147.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	20.	148.	 Id.,	para.	16.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 881	is	acting	jointly	with	Hungary	and	the	Republic	of	Poland	(which	intervened	to	support	the	Czech	Republic)	to	defend	their	common	interest.149	Opposingly,	France	and	the	Commission	intervened	to	support	 the	 Council	 and	 the	 Parliament.	 Third,	 Directive	2017/853,	which	was	contested	by	the	Czech	Republic,	amended	Directive	91/477,	which	was	the	first	legislative	measure	setting	a	minimum	 standard	 regarding	 civilian	 firearms	 acquisition	 and	possession	in	the	European	Union.	On	April	11,	2019,	AG	Sharpston	opined	that	the	claims	by	the	Czech	Republic	are	unsubstantial	and	that	the	CJEU	should	uphold	the	Directive	 as	 it	 stands.150	 The	most	 important	 precedents	 for	this	case	were	the	respective	claims	on	the	legal	basis	against	the	tobacco	 Directives	 from	 tobacco	 manufactures	 (see	 British	
American	Tobacco151	and	Philip	Morris	Brands152).	The	trade,	sale,	and	possession	of	tobacco	in	the	single	market	is	situated	in	a	field	between	health	protection	and	commerce,	whereas,	the	sale,	trade,	and	possession	of	firearms	are	situated	in	a	field	between	security	and	commerce.	The	critical	question	the	CJEU	had	to	answer	was,	if	 Article	 114	 TFEU	 is	 an	 appropriate	 legal	 basis	 for	 measures	which	 in	 large	 parts	 tighten	 security	 standards	 of	 firearm	possession,	or	 if	 this	 impinges	of	 the	national	 sovereignty	of	 the	Member	States	to	regulate	firearms.		
B.	 More	Unity	in	Gun	Ownership	Requirements?	The	CJEU’s	
Decision	on	the	Legality	of	the	Revised	European	Firearms	Directive	
in	C-482/17153	1.	 First	Plea:	Breach	of	the	Principle	of	Conferral	of	Powers	In	 its	 first	 plea,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 alleged	 a	 breach	 of	 the	principle	of	conferral	of	powers	by	the	European	legislature.	The	
                                                        149.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Case	 C-715/17,	 available	 at	http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=219670&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2197421	[https://perma.cc/QY45-6ZAQ].	150.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2.			151.	 Case	C-491/01,	The	Queen	v.	Sec'y	of	State	for	Health,	ex	parte	British	American	Tobacco	(Investments)	Ltd.	&	Imperial	Tobacco	Ltd.,	2002	E.C.R.	I-11453.		152.	 Case	C	–	547/14,	Philip	Morris	Brands	SARL	et	al.	v.	Sec'y	of	State	for	Health,	2016.	153.	 Parts	 of	 the	 following	 analysis	 derive	 from	 an	 earlier	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	published	here,	Niels	Kirst,	Conferred	Powers,	Proportionality	and	Non-discrimination	in	the	
882	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	baseline	of	this	argument	was	that	the	aims	of	the	new	Directive	diverted	 significantly	 from	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 earlier	 Directives	 on	Firearms	of	2008	and	2017.	Therefore,	Article	114	TFEU	ceased	to	constitute	 an	 appropriate	 legal	 basis.	 The	 Czech	 Republic	submitted	 that	 an	 amended	 Directive	 should	 not	 lead	 to	 new	objectives	 which	 derogate	 from	 the	 original	 legal	 basis.154	 By	implementing	the	fight	against	terrorism	within	the	new	Directive,	the	European	legislature	infringed	on	this	principle	and	thus	could	not	base	its	competence	on	the	internal	market	pursuant	to	Article	114	TFEU.	The	CJEU,	first,	generally	discussed	the	appropriate	legal	basis	for	adopting	a	Directive	or	a	Regulation.155	Highlighting	that	new	legislation	 might	 have	 several	 purposes.	 However,	 the	predominant	 purpose	 determines	 the	 appropriate	 legal	 basis	 of	the	new	legislation.	Second,	the	CJEU	broached	on	the	adequate	use	of	 Article	 114	 TFEU,156	 by	 assessing	 that	 the	 fight	 against	international	terrorism	is	an	objective	of	general	 interest	 for	the	European	 Union	 (in	 analogy	 health	 was	 identified	 as	 general	interest	 in	 British	 American	 Tobacco	 and	 Imperial	 Tobacco).157	Subsequently,	the	CJEU	had	to	decide,	if	the	safety	and	prevention	of	 terrorist	attacks	had	become	 the	predominant	purpose	of	 the	amended	Directive	and,	if	therefore,	the	legal	basis	of	Article	114	TFEU	ceased	to	apply.		The	Czech	Republic	argued	that	the	2017	Directive	should	be	analyzed	 in	 isolation	 from	 the	 two	 earlier	 acts.	 In	 contrary,	Parliament	and	Council	argued	that	the	amended	Directive	has	to	be	analyzed	in	light	of	the	two	earlier	Directives.158	The	CJEU	stated	that	an	amended	Directive	must	always	be	assessed	in	light	of	its	earlier	versions.	Therefore,	Directive	91/477	and	the	amendments	by	the	new	Directive	serve	as	benchmark	regarding	the	adequate	legal	basis.	By	discussion	Directive	91/477	and	the	amendments	of	the	contested	Directive,	 the	CJEU	assessed	that	by	“adjusting	the	
                                                        
Czech	 Firearm	 Case,	 BREXIT	 INSTITUTE,	 (Jan.	 14,	 2020),	http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2020/01/conferred-powers-proportionality-and-non-discrimination-in-the-czech-firearm-case/	[https://perma.cc/UR6V-RXKU].	154.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	paras.	21	-	24.		155.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2	,		paras.	31	-	33.	156.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	paras.	34	-	40.	157.	 Case	 C-58/08,	 The	Queen,	 on	 the	Application	 of	 Vodafone	 Ltd.	 and	Others	 v.	Sec'y	of	State	for	Bus.,	Enterprise	and	Reg.	Reform,	2010	E.C.R.	I-04999.	158.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	paras.	41	-	45.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 883	balance	 between	 the	 free	 movement	 of	 goods	 and	 security	guarantees,	[t]he	European	Union	legislature	merely	adopted	the	rule	 on	 the	 possession	 and	 acquisition	 of	 firearms	 set	 out	 in	Directive	 91/477	 to	 changes	 in	 circumstances.	 [emphasis	added]”.159	This	change	to	circumstances	is	a	core	competence	of	the	 European	 Union	 legislature	 in	 its	 task	 of	 safeguarding	 the	general	interests	recognized	by	the	Treaty	(see	also	the	precedent	of	Vodafone	and	Others160).161	By	 pointing	 to	 an	 earlier	 decision	 regarding	 the	 Firearms	Directive	 in	 Buhagiar	 and	 Others,162	 the	 CJEU	 found	 that	 the	predominant	purpose	of	the	measures	read	in	conjunction	with	the	earlier	 Directive	 was	 still	 “the	 free	 movement	 of	 goods,	approximation	of	laws,	regulations	and	administrative	provisions	of	 the	 Member	 States,	 whilst	 circumscribing	 that	 freedom	 with	safety	 guarantees	 that	 are	 suited	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 goods	 at	issue.”163	The	CJEU	found	that	firearms	are	inherently	dangerous	goods,	not	only	for	the	user	itself	(as	the	Czech	Republic	argued	in	the	oral	hearing)164	but	also	for	fellow	citizens,	therefore,	safety,	as	general	 interest	 recognized	by	 the	Treaty,	 can	 form	an	 ancillary	purpose	 of	 a	Directive	 under	Article	 114	TFEU.	 Thus,	 the	 Czech	Republic’s	first	plea	was	unfounded.		2.	 Second	Plea:	Breach	of	the	Principle	of	Proportionality	In	 its	 second	 plea,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 alleged	 that	 the	European	 legislature	 did	 not	 had	 sufficient	 information	 at	 its	disposal	when	it	drafted	the	Directive.	Therefore,	it	was	incapable	of	assessing	the	proportionality	of	the	Directive.165	This	argument	was	based	upon	the	fact	that	the	Commission	failed	to	conduct	an	impact	 assessment	 before	 drafting	 the	 Directive.	 In	 an	interinstitutional	 agreement	 with	 the	 Parliament	 under	 Article	295	 TFEU,	 the	 Commission	 pledged	 to	 carry	 out	 an	 impact	assessment.	However,	when	the	Commission	drafted	the	Directive,	
                                                        159.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	53.		160.	 Case	 C-58/08,	 The	Queen,	 on	 the	Application	 of	 Vodafone	 Ltd.	 and	Others	 v.	Sec'y	of	State	for	Bus.,	Enterprise	and	Reg.	Reform,	2010	E.C.R.	I-04999.	161.	 Case	C-482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	38.		162.	 Case	C-267/16,	Albert	Buhagiar	and	Others	v.	Minister	for	Just.,	O.J.	C	260.		163.		Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	59.	C-482/17,	Czech	Republic	v	European	Parliament	and	Council	of	the	European	Union,	para.	59.	164.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	53.		165.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	paras.	65	-	73.	
884	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	it	lacked	time	for	an	impact	assessment	and	instead	relied	on	the	REFIT	 evaluation,166	which	was	 carried	 out	 as	 a	 general	 review	mechanism.	First,	 the	CJEU	highlighted	a	broad	discretion	which	 the	EU	legislature	has	in	evaluating	and	assessing	legislative	measures.167	Further,	the	CJEU	followed	the	Opinion	of	the	AG	that	a	pledge	to	carry	out	an	impact	assessment	in	an	interinstitutional	agreement	under	Article	295	TFEU	is	a	non-binding	commitment.168	This	is	an	interesting	 finding	 by	 the	 Court	 which	 may	 have	 seminal	consequences	 for	 future	 lawmaking.	The	CJEU	reasoned	 that	 the	lack	of	 an	 impact	assessment	 could	not	automatically	 lead	 to	an	infringement	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality.	 Instead,	 the	availability	 of	 existing	 information	 could	 be	 sufficient	 to	 have	 a	meaningful	assessment	of	the	principle	of	proportionality.169	After	assessing	the	different	studies	(among	them	the	REFIT	evaluation),	which	the	EU	legislature	took	into	account,	the	CJEU	found	that	the	richness	of	those	studies	was	sufficient	for	the	legislature	to	make	a	 meaningful	 assessment	 of	 the	 proportionality	 of	 the	 new	measures.170	In	 the	 second	 part	 of	 its	 second	 plea,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	contested	 singular	 articles	of	 the	new	Directive.	Allegedly,	 these	articles	failed	the	proportionality	test	of	the	European	Union.	The	Czech	Republic	claimed	that	they	could	have	been	achieved	by	less	restrictive	means.171	Specifically,	the	complete	prohibition	of	semi-automatic	 firearms,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 stricter	 requirements	 for	deactivated	 and	 antique	 firearms,	 were	 criticized.172	 Technical	details	of	the	measures	which	the	Czech	Republic	contested	can	be	found	in	the	judgement.173		First,	 the	 CJEU	 clarified,	 that	 the	 judicial	 review	 of	 the	proportionality	of	legislative	acts	is	limited.	The	CJEU	is	not	in	the	position	to	substitute	the	EU	legislature	assessment	by	its	own.174	Instead,	 the	 Court	 can	 only	 assess	 whether	 the	 legislature	
                                                        166.	 Technopolis	et	al.,	supra	note	79.		167.		Case	C-482/17,	supra	note	2,	paras.	76-81.		168.	 Id.	para.	82.	169.	 Id.	para.	85.	170.	 Id.	paras.	87	-	92.		171.	 Id.	paras.	95	-	101.		172.	 Id.	paras.	120,	127.	173.	 Id.	paras.	102	-	104.	174.	 Id.	para.	118.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 885	‘manifestly	 exceeded’	 its	 broad	 discretion.175Assessing	 the	technical	details	of	the	new	prohibitions	of	certain	types	of	semi-automatic	 firearms,	 the	 CJEU	 concluded	 that	 ‘those	 institutions	[the	Council	and	the	Parliament]	do	not	appear	to	have	exceeded	their	broad	discretion’	by	these	prohibitions.176	The	CJEU	found	the	same	 regarding	 the	 proportionality	 of	 the	 new	 measures	concerning	deactivated	and	antique	firearms.177	The	benchmark	of	‘manifestly	inappropriate	in	relation	to	the	objectives’	is	a	high	bar	to	 reach	 for	 new	 legislation	 to	 be	 deemed	 unproportioned.	Therefore,	under	the	CJEU’s	limited	power	and	capacity	of	review,	the	Court	declared	the	new	measures	to	pass	the	proportionality	test.	Lastly,	the	Czech	Republic	alleged	that	the	contested	Directive	interfered	with	the	right	to	property	as	enshrined	in	Article	17	of	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	(hereinafter	“the	Charter”).178	The	CJEU	 found	 that	Article	17	of	 the	Charter	 is	not	an	absolute	right	 and	 may	 be	 restricted	 by	 limitations	 which	 accord	 to	 the	general	interests	recognized	by	the	EU	or	the	need	to	protect	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	others179	(in	regard	to	the	‘right	to	property’	see	 also	 a	 comment	on	 SEGRO,180	 in	which	 the	CJEU	extensively	discussed	Article	17	of	the	Charter).	The	CJEU	found	the	evidence	brought	 forward	 by	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 insufficient	 to	 prove	 a	disproportionate	 interference	 with	 the	 right	 to	 property.	Moreover,	 the	 CJEU	 concluded	 that	 a	 ban	 on	 semi-automatic	firearms	for	safety	reasons	is	in	the	general	interest,	which	is	also	recognized	in	the	last	sentence	of	Article	17	(1)	of	the	Charter.	In	consequence,	the	Czech	Republic’s	second	plea	failed.		3.	 Third	Plea:	Breach	of	the	Principle	of	Legal	Certainty	and	of	the	Protection	of	Legitimate	Expectations	In	 its	 third	 plea,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 alleged	 that	 specific	measures	of	the	new	Directive	impinged	on	the	principle	of	legal	
                                                        175.	 Id.	para.	119.	176.	 Id.	para.	126.	177.	 Id.	para.	131.	178.	 Id.	para.	132.		179.	 Id.	para.	134.	180.	 See	generally	Xavier	Groussot	et	al.,	SEGRO	and	its	Aftermath:	Between	Economic	
Freedoms,	Property	Rights	and	the	‘Essence	of	the	Rule	of	Law,	2	NORDIC	J.		EUR.	L.	69	(2019).	
886	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	certainty	and	legitimate	legal	expectations.181	Specifically,	the	time	requirements	 of	 the	 new	 Directive	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 retroactive	application.	 Further,	 the	 process	 of	 entering	 into	 force	 of	 the	Directive	 lead	 to	 unattainable	 expectations	 on	 the	 part	 of	individuals.		Regarding	 the	 plea	 of	 lacking	 legal	 certainty,	 the	 CJEU	rebutted	 the	 argument	 by	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 The	 Court	highlighted	that	the	classification	of	firearms	in	the	new	Directive	is	clear	and	precise,	and	does,	therefore,	not	lead	to	a	retroactive	application.182	 Regarding	 the	 plea	 of	 unattainable	 legitimate	expectations	 of	 individuals,	 the	 CJEU	 highlighted	 that	 the	 EU	legislature	 fulfilled	 its	 requirement	 by	 publishing	 the	 contested	Directive	in	the	Official	Journal	of	the	EU	in	a	timely	manner.	This	allowed	individuals	to	know	at	which	point	the	new	rules	will	come	into	 force,	 and	 until	 when	 they	 could	 buy	 which	 kinds	 of	firearms.183	4.	 Fourth	Plea:	Breach	of	the	Principle	of	Non-Discrimination	In	 its	 fourth	plea,	 the	Czech	Republic	 alleged	 that	 the	Swiss	
exception	 clause	 (Article	 6(6)	 of	 the	 contested	Directive),	which	allows	Swiss	militia	soldiers	to	keep	their	semi-automatic	firearms	after	 completing	 their	 service	 with	 the	 Swiss	 army,	 constitutes	discrimination	against	other	individuals.184	Why	was	the	Directive	pertinent	 for	 Switzerland	 while	 it	 is	 not	 part	 of	 the	 European	Union?	This	was	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Directive	is	pertinent	to	all	Member	States	of	the	Schengen	area,	among	them	Switzerland.	The	CJEU	first	recalled	the	principle	of	non-discrimination	in	European	Union	 law	as	 requiring	 that	 “comparable	 situations	must	not	be	treated	differently	and	that	different	situations	must	not	be	treated	in	the	same	way	unless	such	treatment	is	objectively	justified.”185	The	 CJEU	 found	 that	 the	 Swiss	 Confederation	 and	 the	 other	Member	States	are	not	comparable	regarding	the	subject	matter	of	that	 derogation.	 The	 Swiss	 Confederation	 “[h]as	 the	 proven	experience	and	ability	to	trace	and	monitor	persons	and	weapons	concerned,	which	gives	reason	to	assume	that	the	public	security	
                                                        181.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	paras.	140	-	143.	182.	 Id.	paras.	149	-	151.	183.	 Id.	paras.	153	-	156.		184.	 Id.	paras.	159	-	161.	185.	 Id.	para.	164.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 887	and	 safety	 objectives”	 will	 be	 achieved.186	 Moreover,	 the	 Czech	Republic	 failed	 to	 bring	 evidence	 forward	 that	 there	 are	 other	states	within	the	Schengen	area	which	that	have	the	same	system	of	 mandatory	 subscription	 and	 transfer	 of	 military	 firearms	 in	place	as	the	Swiss	Confederation.	Hence,	the	CJEU	also	rejected	the	last	plea	of	the	Czech	Republic.187	
C.	 Comment	on	the	Judgement	of	the	CJEU	in	Czech	Republic	v	
Parliament	and	Council	
Czech	 Republic	 v	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 is	 a	 detailed	 and	comprehensive	judgment	which	touches	upon	many	principles	of	European	Union	law.	It	ends	the	legal	challenge	between	the	Czech	Republic	and	 the	European	Union.	The	 tactic	of	exhausting	 legal	remedies	after	being	outvoted	in	the	Council	has	a	long	tradition	in	the	 European	 Union	 legal	 order	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Spain	 v	
Parliament	and	Council188).	This	was	also	in	the	Czech	Firearms	the	recurring	storyline.	The	Czech	Republic	took	legal	actions	after	it	had	been	outvoted	in	the	Council,	and	its	MEPs	had	not	been	heard	in	 the	 Parliament.	 The	 judicial	 route	 is	 a	 preferred	 route	 for	Member	State’s	governments	thereafter.	However,	the	question	of	firearms	regulation	is	highly	political.	Therefore,	a	legal	discussion	on	the	substance	might	not	be	the	right	tool	to	address	the	issue.	The	 contested	 Directive	 places	 more	 emphasis	 on	 security	requirements	 for	 legal	 firearms	 holders	 in	 the	 European	 Union.	Further,	the	contested	Directive	prohibits	the	possession	of	semi-automatic	firearms	within	the	European	single	market	by	civilians.	The	 pleas	 of	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 focused	 on	 the	 outer	 limits	 of	Article	114	TFEU.	Is	this	Article	suitable	for	tightening	of	firearms	possession,	or	does	 it	 fall	 into	the	area	of	 judicial	cooperation	 in	criminal	matters	and	must,	therefore,	be	adopted	under	Article	84	TFEU?	This	was	the	question	the	Court	essentially	had	to	answer.	From	the	tobacco	advertising	case-law	of	the	CJEU,	it	is	known	that	Article	114	TFEU	can	be	interpreted	broadly.	In	this	case,	the	CJEU	followed	 its	 earlier	 line	 of	 reasoning	 by	 allowing	 security	 as	 an	
                                                        186.	 Id.	para.	166.	187.	 Id.	paras.	167	-	168.	188.	 Case	C-146/13,	Kingdom	of	Spain	v.	Eur.	Parl.	&	Council	of	the	Eur.	Union,	2015	E.C.R.	I-3.		
888	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	objective	of	a	Directive,	which	was	adopted	 in	 the	single	market	under	the	competence	of	Article	114	TFEU.	By	 this	 judgement,	 the	CJEU	affirmed	 the	 federal	 legislative	competence	of	the	European	Union	to	lower	the	ceiling	of	firearm	possession	in	the	European	Union.	Firearms	are	goods	that	are	sold	and	 purchased	 on	 the	 internal	 market;	 therefore,	 the	 EU	 is	 the	adequate	body	to	regulate,	and	the	internal	market	competence	is	sufficient	to	harmonize	the	possession	of	firearms	in	the	EU.	As	a	result,	Member	States	have	to	converge	and	adjust	in	their	firearm	regulations	(if	they	not	already	did).	Some	Member	States	already	have	a	higher	bar	of	firearms	possessions	as	the	one	purported	by	the	Directive,	other	as	the	Czech	Republic	now	have	to	change	their	national	 laws	 accordingly.	 The	 political	 consequence	 of	 this	judgement	 is	 that	 also	 in	highly	political	 fields,	 such	as	 firearms	regulation,	Member	States	have	to	abide	by	the	qualified	consensus	in	 the	 Council.	 In	 conclusion,	 the	 CJEU	 upheld	 the	 federal	competence	 in	 opposition	 to	 national	 defiance.	 In	 the	 following	Part	IV	of	the	article,	the	present	case	(Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	
and	Council)	will	be	compared	to	SCOTUS’s	United	States	v	Lopez	decision.	
IV.	COMPARISON	TO	UNITED	STATES	V	LOPEZ	–	CHALLENGE	OF	
THE	GUNFREE	SCHOOL	ZONE	ACT	AT	THE	UNITED	STATES	
SUPREME	COURT		But,	so	long	as	Congress'	authority	is	limited	to	those	powers	enumerated	 in	 the	 Constitution,	 and	 so	 long	 as	 those	enumerated	 powers	 are	 interpreted	 as	 having	 judicially	enforceable	outer	 limits,	 congressional	 legislation	under	 the	Commerce	Clause	always	will	engender	"legal	uncertainty.”189		Chief	 Justice	William	H.	Rehnquist	 in	his	majority	opinion	in	United	States	v	Lopez.	Stressing	that	federal	powers	under	the	Commerce	Clause	have	an	outer	limit.			 In	Part	IV	of	the	article,	the	proceedings	in	front	of	the	CJEU	in	
Czech	 Republic	 v	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 (C-482/17)	 will	 be	
                                                        189.	 United	States	v.	Lopez,	514	U.S.	549,	551	(1995).	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 889	compared	to	the	Lopez	case	 law	of	SCOTUS.	From	a	comparative	viewpoint,	 the	case	SCOTUS	Lopez190	 can	give	some	guidance	on	the	 federal	 competence	 to	 regulate	 firearms	 in	 a	 similar	 federal	legal	 system.	 In	 this	 landmark	 judgment,	 the	US	 Supreme	 Court	found	that	a	ban	on	firearms	in	schools	cannot	be	regulated	on	a	federal	 level	 by	 using	 Article	 I,	 Section	 8,	 Clause	 3	 of	 the	 US	Constitution,	 known	 as	 the	 Commerce	 Clause.	 Compared	 to	 the	United	States,	the	CJEU	was	more	willing	to	give	leeway	to	Article	114	TFEU	 (the	 comparable	Article	 in	 the	EU	 legal	 system	 to	 the	Commerce	Clause)	to	regulate	the	use	of	firearms	in	the	Member	States.	
Lopez	 is	 a	 highly	 interesting	 SCOTUS	 decision	 in	 many	regards.	First,	it	concerns	a	case	of	firearms	legislation	in	which	the	federal	law	was	invoked	to	prosecute	firearms	possession.	Second,	the	case	discusses	the	intensity	of	judicial	scrutiny	by	the	Supreme	Court	when	Congress	enacts	laws.	Finally,	it	marks	a	limitation	of	the	federal	powers	of	lawmaking	under	the	Commerce	Clause	at	a	time	at	which	most	law	scholars	in	the	United	States	thought	that	there	are	literally	no	restrictions	on	the	legislative	mandate	of	the	Congress	 under	 the	 Commerce	 Clause.191	 It	 is	 a	 case	 about	federalism,	 its	 powers,	 limits,	 and	 its	 influence	 on	 firearms	legislation.	Therefore,	 it	 is	highly	 logical	 to	 compare	 this	 case	 to	
Czech	 Republic	 v	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 since	 both	 cases	fundamentally	 question	 the	 power	 of	 federal	 lawmaking	 in	 the	area	of	firearms	legislation.	
A.	 The	Background	of	United	States	v	Lopez	The	case	concerned	Alfonso	Lopez,	which	brought	a	gun	to	his	school	on	March	12,	1992,	to	sell	it	to	another	pupil	in	view	of	the	gun	being	used	in	a	gang	fight.192	After	his	conduct	was	exposed,	he	was	 charged	 violating	 the	 GunFree	 School	 Zone	 Act	 of	 1990.	 A	federal	criminal	 law	enacted	under	 the	Commerce	Clause.	Lopez	challenged	the	constitutionality	of	this	act	in	the	Court	of	Appeals	for	 the	 Fifth	 Circuit,	 the	 Texas	 district	 court.	 In	 an	 astonishing	judgment	the	court	found	that	section	922	of	the	act	“[i]n	the	full	
                                                        190.	 Id.	191.		Deborah	Jones	Merritt,	Commerce!,	94	MICH.	L.	REV.	674,	675	(1995).	192.	 Molly	E.	Homan,	Comment,	United	States	v.	Lopez:	The	Supreme	Court	Guns	Down	
the	Commerce	Clause,	73	DENV.	U.	L.	REV.	237,	237(1995).	
890	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	reach	of	its	terms,	is	invalid	as	beyond	the	power	of	Congress	under	the	 Commerce	 Clause.”193	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 found,	 “[t]hat	Congress	failed	to	show,	through	legislative	findings	or	legislative	history,	 how	 gun	 possession	 in	 a	 school	 zone	 affects	 interstate	commerce.”194	The	US	government	filed	a	petition	to	SCOTUS	for	a	review	 of	 the	 district	 court’s	 decision.	 In	 sweeping	 judgment,	SCOTUS	 held	 that	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 is	 limited,	 and	 the	aggregated	 effect	 of	 carrying	handguns	 in	 a	 school	 environment	was	not	sufficiently	 linked	to	 interstate	commerce.	This	decision	was	groundbreaking	in	the	way	that	it	was	the	first	case	since	1937	and	the	New	Deal	legislation	in	which	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	Congress	had	exceeded	its	power	to	legislate	under	the	Commerce	Clause.	
B.	 Why	is	United	States	v	Lopez	Pertinent	to	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council?	Why	is	it	appropriate	to	compare	this	case	with	the	decision	of	the	CJEU	in	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council?	Article	114	TFEU	 is	 a	 suitable	 comparator	 to	 the	US	 Commerce	 Clause.	 The	similarities	 between	 both	 articles	 have	 been	 acknowledged	 by	numerous	authors	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	“[t]he	Commerce	Clause	 resembles	 Article	 114	 TFEU,	 the	 provision	 granting	 the	legislator	of	the	European	Union	power	to	adopt	harmonizing	acts	in	relation	to	the	internal	market.”195	Therefore,	it	is	reasonable	to	compare	 both	 cases.	 In	 both	 cases,	 a	 federal	 law	 on	 firearms	possession	 (Directive	 2017/853;	 the	 GunFree	 School	 Zone	 Act)	was	 enacted	 by	 the	 federal	 lawmaker	 (Parliament	 and	 Council;	Congress).	 In	 both,	 cases	 the	 federal	 lawmaker	 used	 its	 internal	market	 competence	 to	 enact	 the	 law	 (Article	 114	 TFEU;	 the	Commerce	 Clause),	 and	 this	 competence	 was	 subsequently	challenged	in	front	of	the	apex	courts	of	the	respective	legal	system	(CJEU;	 SCOTUS).	 Moreover,	 in	 both	 cases,	 the	 respective	 apex	courts	 then	 had	 to	 decide	 if	 the	 federal	 legislative	 body	overstepped	its	competence	by	enacting	firearms	regulation	under	the	cloak	of	inter-state	commerce.	
                                                        193.	 United	States	v.	Lopez,	2	F.3d	1342,	1367-68	(5th	Cir.	1993),	aff'd,	514	U.S.	549	(1995).		194.	 Homan,	supra	note	192,	at	264.		195.	 Lena	Boucon,	E.U.	Free	Movement	Law	and	 the	Powers	Retained	by	Member	States	(Dec.	12,	2014)	(Eur.	U.	Inst.)	at	21.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 891	Of	course,	the	differences	between	both	cases	should	not	be	overlooked.	While	in	Lopez,	an	individual	applicant	challenges	the	constitutionality	 of	 a	 federal	 criminal	 act,	 in	 Czech	 Republic	 v	
Parliament	 and	 Council,	 a	 Member	 State	 challenges	 the	constitutionality	 of	 a	 federal	 Directive	 of	 firearms	 possession.	However,	 these	 differences	 are	 in	 view	 of	 the	 Author	 not	 too	differential	to	spare	the	beneficial	use	of	a	thorough	comparison	of	both	cases.	
C.	 Comparing	Both	Judgements	1.	 The	Respective	Standard	of	Review	According	 to	 the	case-law	of	 the	Supreme	Court	concerning	the	judicial	review	of	legislative	acts	under	the	Commerce	Clause	before	Lopez,	 the	Supreme	Court	would	exercise	a	rational	basis	review.	This	is	a	limited	review	under	which	the	SCOTUS	would	not	go	 into	 depth	 when	 analyzing	 congressional	 powers	 under	 the	Commerce	Clause.	“Traditionally,	under	 ‘rational	basis’	review,	if	the	court	perceives	any	plausible	reason	for	congressional	action,	the	 inquiry	 ends.”196	 It	 is	 not	 upon	 SCOTUS’s	 competence	 to	imagine	 a	 better	 way	 how	 the	 legislature	 could	 have	 enacted	 a	specific	 act.	 “The	 judiciary’s	 ability	 to	 imagine	 a	 better,	 more	perfect	 solution	does	 not	 render	 a	 law	 irrational.”197	 The	CJEU’s	judicial	 review	 on	 acts	 adopted	 under	 Article	 114	 TFEU	 seems	similar	but	distinct.	It	is	also	not	under	the	CJEU’s	power	to	read	something	 into	 the	 law	 and	 to	 imagine	 a	 better	 way	 how	 the	legislature	could	have	enacted	a	specific	Regulation	or	Directive.	“[t]he	criterion	to	be	applied	is	not	whether	a	measure	adopted	in	such	an	area	was	the	only	or	the	best	possible	measure,	since	its	legality	 can	 be	 affected	 only	 if	 the	 measure	 is	 manifestly	inappropriate	having	regard	to	the	objective	which	the	competent	institution	is	seeking	to	pursue.”198	Neither	it	is	upon	the	CJEU	to	carry	 out	 its	 own	 impact	 assessment.	 “[a]s	 regards	 the	 subject	matter	of	 the	 judicial	 review	to	be	carried	out	by	 the	Court,	 it	 is	important	to	note	that	[…]	it	is	not	for	the	Court	to	substitute	its	own	assessment	for	that	of	the	EU	legislature.”199	The	standard	of	
                                                        196.	 Homan,	supra	note	192,	at	277.	197.	 Id.	at	278.	198.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2.	199.	 Id.	para.	118.	
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exceeded	 its	 broad	 discretion	 in	 view	 of	 the	 objectives	 pursued	with	the	legislative	act.	“[i]t	is	for	the	Court	to	determine	whether	the	EU	 legislature	manifestly	 exceeded	 its	broad	discretion	with	regard	to	the	complex	assessments	and	evaluations	it	was	called	upon	to	conduct	in	the	present	case,	by	opting	for	measures	that	were	 manifestly	 inappropriate	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 objective	pursued.”200	The	difference	in	the	standard	of	review	by	both	courts	comes	to	light	when	it	comes	to	the	findings	of	the	lawmaker.	Historically,	findings	played	no	significant	part	in	SCOTUS’s	standard	of	review	under	 the	 Commerce	 Clause.	 However,	 Lopez	 seemed	 to	 have	changed	 that.	 “Since	 findings	 bear	 no	 significance	 under	 typical	rational	 basis	 review,	 and	 since	 the	 Lopez	 Court	 suggested	 that	Congress	include	findings,	it	seems	the	Court	raised	the	standard	of	review	to	something	more	than	rational	basis.”201	Homan	even	argues	that	thus	SCOTUS	significantly	raised	its	standard	of	review.	CJEU	 acknowledged	 in	 earlier	 case-law	 that	 the	 findings	 of	 the	lawmaker	 play	 a	 part	 when	 assessing	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	lawmaker	 in	 a	 specific	 case.	 “[T]he	 EU	 legislature’s	 broad	discretion,	 which	 implies	 limited	 judicial	 review	 of	 its	 exercise,	applies	 not	 only	 to	 the	 nature	 and	 scope	 of	 the	measures	 to	 be	taken	but	also,	to	some	extent,	to	the	finding	of	the	basic	facts.”202	Therefore,	 the	 CJEU	 took	 into	 account	 the	 findings	 which	 were	provided	by	the	legislative	branch	to	the	CJEU.	“It	follows	that	the	institutions	must	at	the	very	least	be	able	to	produce	and	set	out	clearly	and	unequivocally	the	basic	facts	which	had	to	be	taken	into	account	as	the	basis	of	the	contested	measures	of	the	act	and	on	which	the	exercise	of	their	discretion	depended.”203	 It,	 therefore,	might	not	be	a	full	fact	and	findings	analysis,	which	the	CJEU	carries	out	as	 its	 standard	of	 review.	However,	 the	CJEU	scrutinizes	 the	findings	if	they	complement	the	argumentation	of	the	legislature.	Similarly,	an	emphasis	on	the	legislative	duty	to	provide	findings	can	be	 inferred	from	Lopez.	 “Now,	under	the	reasoning	of	Lopez,	the	Court	will	look	not	to	what	Congress	might	have	thought,	but	
                                                        200.	 Id.	para.	119.	201.	 Homan,	supra	note	192,	at	278.	202.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	78.			203.	 Id.	para.	81.	
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 893	demand	 findings	 expressing	 what	 Congress	 did	 reason.”204	Therefore,	 SCOTUS’s	 standard	 of	 review	 under	 the	 Commerce	Clause	shifted	with	Lopez	towards	a	standard	of	review,	which	is	exercised	by	the	CJEU.	2.	 Lack	of	Expressed	Findings	in	Lopez	or	the	Lacking	Impact	Assessment	in	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council	In	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council,	the	Czech	Republic	argued	 that	 the	 EU	 lawmaker	 had	 not	 adhered	 to	 its	 own	standards.	Namely,	 to	conduct	an	 impact	assessment	 to	evaluate	potential	needs	and	the	necessity	of	a	new	Directive	in	the	field	of	firearms	 legislation.	 Analogically,	 SCOTUS	 lamented	 the	 lack	 of	expressed	 congressional	 findings	 in	 Lopez.	 “The	 Court	 did	 not	mandate	 these	 findings,	 and	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 GunFree	 School	Zone	Act	did	not	turn	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	findings,	but	the	Lopez	Court	certainly	educated	Congress	on	what	role	findings	play.”205	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 courts	 affirmed	 that	 the	 federal	lawmaker	 is	 not	 necessarily	 obliged	 to	 include	 findings	 into	 the	legislation	of	what	impact	that	legislation	would	have	on	interstate	commerce.	But,	 it	was	 in	Lopez	a	potentially	decisive	 factor	 that	Congress	did	not	provide	adequate	findings	in	regard	to	the	impact	of	 the	 act	 on	 interstate	 commerce.206	 As	 Deborah	 Jones	 Merritt	notes,	 “[a]ltough	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 refused	 to	 require	congressional	findings	or	a	legislative	history	as	a	prerequisite	to	sustaining	 a	 statute	 under	 the	 Commerce	 Clause,	 the	 lack	 of	congressional	 attention	 undoubtedly	 contributed	 to	 the	 Court’s	decision.”207	In	Czech	Republic	 v	 Parliament	 and	 Council,	 the	 CJEU	 found	that	 an	 interinstitutional	 agreement	 that	 pledges	 an	 impact	assessment	 is	 not	 binding	 for	 the	 federal	 lawmaker	 and	 that,	therefore,	this	cannot	be	the	sole	ground	to	strike	down	a	Directive.	In	 fact,	 the	 CJEU	was	 content	with	 the	 REFIT	 report,	 which	 the	Commission	 produced	 as	 an	 adequate	 finding	 in	 regard	 to	 the	impact	of	 the	Directive	on	 the	single	market.	Also,	 the	Directive,	unlike	 the	GunFree	School	Zone	Act,	mentions	 the	 findings	 from	previous	 studies	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 gun	 possession.	 While	 “[t]he	
                                                        204.	 Homan,	supra	note	192,	at	278.		205.	 Id.	at	277.	206.	 Jones	Merritt,	supra	note	191,	at	697.		207.		Id.	at	698.	
894	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	GunFree	School	Zone	Act	of	1990	contained	no	findings,	and	the	Court	refused	to	import	findings	from	previous	similar	but	distinct	acts.”208	In	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council,	the	CJEU	relied	on	 findings	 regarding	 the	 earlier	 Directives	 and	 included	 the	legislative	history	 in	 its	assessment.	This	 is	a	decisive	difference	between	both	legislations	in	regard	to	the	judicial	review	exercised	by	the	relevant	supreme	court.	3.	 The	Right	to	Property	in	the	Respective	Legal	Orders	In	both	cases,	the	right	to	property	played	a	crucial	role.	While	the	European	Union	respects	the	right	to	property	in	Article	17	of	the	 Charter,	 the	 US	 places	 the	 right	 to	 property	 in	 the	 Second	Amendment	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution	 (hereinafter	 “the	Constitution”).	The	Czech	Republic	 invoked	the	right	to	property	as	 a	 defense	 for	 firearms	 possession	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 In	arguing,	 that	 the	Directive	may	 have	 a	 direct	 impact	 on	 firearm	holders	in	the	way	that	they	are	deprived	of	their	property	with	the	enactment	of	the	Directive.	Notably,	the	same	argument	was	made	in	 the	 United	 States.	 “Rhetoric	 in	 some	 lower	 court	 opinion	explicitly	opposed	the	GunFree	School	Zones	Act	as	contrary	to	the	right	of	private	homeowners.”209	Despite	that	the	right	to	property	was	the	decisive	argument	for	SCOTUS	judgment,	it	was	definitely	a	 factor	 in	making	 the	decision	 for	Lopez.	The	CJEU,	 in	contrary,	noted	that	“[i]t	follows	that	it	has	not	been	established,	from	the	elements	in	the	file	before	the	Court,	that	the	limitations	placed	by	the	 contested	 directive	 on	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 right	 to	 property	recognised	by	the	Charter,	 in	particular	with	regard	to	the	semi-automatic	firearms	[…],	constitute	a	disproportionate	interference	with	 that	 right.”210	 Thus,	 there	 was	 not	 disproportionate	circumvention	of	the	right	to	property	as	recognized	by	the	Charter	with	the	provisions	of	the	new	Directive.	It	is	sufficient	to	say	that	the	right	to	property	has	indeed	a	much	higher	standing	in	terms	of	recognition	as	a	fundamental	right	in	the	United	States	than	in	the	European	Union.	This	was	reflected	in	the	respective	role	the	right	 to	 property	 played	 in	 Lopez	 and	 in	 Czech	 Republic	 v	
Parliament	and	Council.	
                                                        208.		Homan,	supra	note	192,	at	277.		209.	 Jones	Merritt,	supra	note	191,	at	701.		210.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2,	para.	138.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 895	4.	 The	Argument	of	National	Urgency	The	majority	opinion	by	Chief	Justice	Rehnquist	in	Lopez	was	also	influenced	by	the	lack	of	national	necessity	and	urgency	of	the	issue	under	scrutiny.	Texas	had	a	national	law	prohibiting	firearms	on	school	grounds,	which	was	working	well.	Therefore	the	federal	criminalization	 of	 firearms	 possession	 seemed	 superfluous.	“Congress	 made	 no	 findings,	 and	 the	 Government	 made	 no	argument	 in	 Lopez,	 that	 state	 and	 local	 officials	 were	 unable	 to	enforce	 these	 laws.”211	 This	 situation	 was	 radically	 different	 in	
Czech	 Republic	 v	 Parliament	 and	 Council.212	Notably,	 two	 terror	attacks	 in	Paris	and	Copenhagen	 led	to	the	swift	adoption	of	 the	Directive.213	During	these	terror	attacks,	semi-automatic	firearms	were	 used214,	 the	 legislative	 response	 was	 the	 prohibition	 of	civilian	semi-automatic	firearm	possession	in	the	European	Union.	National	laws	of	the	Member	States	seemed	insufficient	in	regard	to	the	regulation	of	semi-automatic	firearms.	The	CJEU,	therefore,	potentially	took	into	account	the	need	for	this	new	law,	which	was	enacted	 during	 turbulent	 times	 in	 Europe.	 While	 a	 national	emergency	cannot	be	the	absolute	vindication	for	any	law	under	any	competence,	it	probably	has	influenced	the	CJEU	in	its	decision	making.	 Indeed,	 the	 French	 advocate	 emphasized	 in	 the	 court	hearing	 the	 vindication	 of	 this	 legislation	 in	 light	 of	 the	 terror	attacks	which	happened	 in	Europe.215	Eventually,	 this	 emotional	argument	beyond	a	black	letter	law	analysis	was	well-received	by	the	judges.	Contrary,	the	US	Government	failed	to	find	a	reason	for	a	national	emergency	in	the	case	of	the	GunFree	School	Zone	Act.	“The	Government’s	 failure	 to	 identify	 an	urgent	 need	 to	 combat	that	problem,	however,	contributed	to	the	majority’s	rejection	of	congressional	power.”216	
                                                        211.	 Jones	Merritt,	supra	note	191,	at	703-04.			212.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2.	213.	 Hans	von	der	Burchard	&	Ryan	Heath,	EU	takes	aim	at	weapons	tied	to	terror	
attacks,	 POLITICO	 (Nov.	 18,	 2015),	 https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-takes-aim-at-weapons-tied-to-terror-attacks-commission-schengen/	[https://perma.cc/HG8R-QEKT].	214.	 Andersen,	supra	note	88.	215.	 Case	C	–	482/17,	supra	note	2.	216.	Jones	Merritt,	supra	note	191,	at	703-04.			
896	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	5.	 The	Federalization	of	Criminal	Law	The	 GunFree	 School	 Zone	 Act	 was	 a	 federal	 criminal	 law	enacted	by	Congress.217	Whereas	 the	Firearms	Directive	 is	not	a	criminal	 law.	 Instead,	 it	 is	 an	 act	 regulating	 the	 trade	 and	possession	of	firearms	in	the	European	Union.	The	EU	legislature	cannot	 prescribe	 criminal	 penalties	 since	 this	 is	 a	 competence	reserved	for	the	Member	States.218	Ultimately,	the	European	Union	can	only	require	Member	States	to	enact	effective,	proportionate,	and	 dissuasive	 penalties	 for	 individuals	 that	 infringe	 upon	 a	Directive	 or	 Regulation.219	 The	 law	 enforcement,	 as	 well	 as	 the	precise	penalties,	are	however,	in	the	hands	of	the	Member	State’s	police	and	judiciary.	There	is	no	powerful	federal	police	force,	such	as	 the	 Federal	 Bureau	 of	 Investigation	 (FBI),	 in	 the	 European	Union.220	Only	Europol	could	be	compared	in	this	regard.	However,	the	competence	and	power	of	Europol	are	much	more	limited.	The	agency	has	no	executive	power,	and	its	officials	are	not	entitled	to	arrest	suspects	in	the	Member	States.221	Therefore,	while	the	factor	of	federalization	of	criminal	law	influenced	the	decision	in	Lopez,	it	played	 no	 part	 in	 the	 decision-finding	 in	 Czech	 Republic	 v	
Parliament	 and	 Council.	At	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	federal	act	was	domiciled	in	the	area	of	criminal	 law	might	have	influenced	 the	 judges	 towards	 a	 negative	 decision.	 “The	 Lopez	majority	 stressed	 that	 criminal	 law,	 like	 education,	 is	 a	 matter	traditionally	 left	 to	 the	 states.”	 By	 the	 act,	 there	 was	 further	duplication	 of	 state	 and	 federal	 crimes	 in	 that	 area,	 since	 Texas	already	 had	 in	 place	 an	 act	 which	 prohibited	 firearms	 around	schools.	The	question	left	in	Lopez	is,	why	the	federal	prosecutor	took	 the	 case	when	 there	was	 effective	 law	 enforcement	 on	 the	state	level.	
                                                        217.	 Gun-Free	School	Zones	Act		§	921(a)(25)	Crime	Control	Act	of	1990		(1990).	218.	 VALSAMIS	MITSILEGAS,	ET	AL.,	RESEARCH	HANDBOOK	ON	EU	CRIMINAL	LAW	(2016).	219.	 Id.	220.	 See	generally	Monica	Den	Boer	&	Willy	Bruggeman,	Shifting	Gear	:	Europol	in	the	
Contemporary	 Policing	 Era,	 3	 POLITIQUE	 EUROPÉENNE	 (2007),	https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2007-3-page-77.htm#	[https://perma.cc/Z7D7-NKJE].	221.	 Id.		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 897	6.	 The	Need	to	Set	a	Limit	to	the	Federal	Legislative	Competence	The	Commerce	Clause,	as	Article	114	TFEU,	gives	the	federal	lawmaker	 broad	 powers	 to	 legislate	 in	 the	 area	 of	 interstates	commerce	 and	 the	 internal	 market.	 Potentially,	 there	 was	 a	willingness	 at	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 to	 set	 a	 limit	 to	 these	 broad	powers.	 “Before	Lopez,	many	 academics	 and	 lower	 court	 judges	speculated	that	the	Commerce	Clause	no	longer	imposed	any	limits	on	 congressional	 action.”222	 The	 federal	 branch	 had	 legislated	under	the	Commerce	Clause	without	any	restraint	since	1937,223	therefore,	 SCOTUS	 may	 have	 thought	 that	 approving	 the	 very	feeble	and	weak	arguments	and	 justification	by	 the	Government	would	have	eventually	led	to	the	perception	that	there	are	factually	no	restraints	for	Congress	under	the	Commerce	Clause.	“The	Lopez	majority	 expressed	 grave	 concern	 that	 sustaining	 the	 GunFree	School	Zones	Act	under	the	Government’s	rationales	would	render	Congress’s	 commerce	 power	 completely	 unbounded.”224	Oppositely,	in	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council,	there	was	no	need	for	the	CJEU	to	make	a	point	that	there	are	limits	under	Article	114	TFEU.	In	fact,	the	EU	had	might	had	its	Lopez	moment	already	 earlier.	 Respectively,	 in	 the	 case	 Federal	 Republic	 of	
Germany	v	European	Parliament	and	Council	of	the	European	Union,	the	 CJEU	 stroke	 down	 the	 tobacco	 advertising	 Directive	 for	 its	wrong	 legal	basis.225	 In	Germany	v	Parliament	and	Council226	 the	CJEU	 found	 that	 harmonization	 under	 Article	 114	 TFEU	 is	 not	without	limits,	as	regards	a	ban	on	advertising	of	tobacco	products.	In	 this	 case,	 the	CJEU	 “[s]aid	 the	directive	 should	not	have	been	adopted	 as	 an	 EU	 internal	 market	 directive	 aimed	 at	 removing	market	distortions.	Germany	 and	 the	producers	 argued	 it	was	 a	public	health	measure.”227	In	this	case,	the	CJEU	found	that	the	EU	legislature	 cannot	 rely	 on	 Article	 114	 TFEU	 “[s]imply	 because	
                                                        222.	 Jones	Merritt,	supra	note	191,	at	703-04.		223.	 The	last	time	SCOTUS	limited	congressional	power	under	the	Commerce	Clause	was	during	the	New	Deal	Era,	when	the	SCOTUS	resisted	against	FDR’s	political	agenda.	BRUCE	A.	ACKERMAN,	WE	THE	PEOPLE:	TRANSFORMATIONS	314	(1998).	224.	 Jones	Merritt,	supra	note	191,	at	712.		225.	 Case	C-376/98,	Fed.	Republic	of	Ger.	v.	Eur.	Parl.	&	Council	of	the	Eur.	Union,	2000	E.C.R.	I-8534.		226.	 Id.	at	I-8533.	227.	 European	Court	Overturns	Ban	on	Tobacco	Advertising,	GUARDIAN	(Oct.	5,	2000),	https://www.theguardian.com/media/2000/oct/05/advertising	[https://perma.cc/K88Q-MXU7].	
898	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	actual	or	potential	divergences	in	national	rules	are	found.	It	is	only	insofar	as	such	disparities	restrict	interstate-trade	in	goods	and/or	services	or	imply	an	appreciable	distortion	of	competition,	and	if	harmonisation	 actually	 improves	 the	 establishment	 and	functioning	 of	 the	 internal	 market,	 […].”228	 While	 this	 case	 was	between	commerce	and	public	health,	it	certainly	is	comparable	to	
Lopez	in	the	way	the	Court	set	a	limit	to	the	federal	competences.	In	 the	United	States,	 that	had	not	been	done	since	 the	New	Deal	legislation,	 and	 therefore,	 there	 was	 an	 apparent	 need	 for	 the	SCOTUS	to	demonstrate	the	limits	to	the	Commerce	Clause.	In	the	European	Union,	 the	Commission	had	already	acknowledged	the	limits	of	Article	114	TFEU	and,	 therefore,	drafted	any	 legislation	very	more	thoroughly	under	Article	114	TFEU.	
V.	 CONCLUSION	The	 final	 Part	 IV	 of	 this	 article	 has	 aimed	 to	 display	 an	enriching	comparison	between	the	regulation	of	firearms	in	the	EU	and	in	the	United	States	and	its	respective	legal	challenges	at	the	relevant	 apex	 court.	 Demonstrating	 the	 comparisons	 and	differences	of	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council	and	Lopez.	While	in	Czech	Republic	v	Parliament	and	Council,	the	CJEU	held	up	the	 Firearms	 Directive	 under	 the	 single	 market	 competence.	 In	
Lopez,	 SCOTUS	 declared	 that	 the	 federal	 lawmaker	 had	overstepped	its	competences	by	enacting	the	GunFree	School	Zone	Act	 under	 the	 Commerce	 Clause.	 The	 comparison,	 however,	underlines	that	in	both	systems,	the	federal	lawmaker	has	a	very	wide	 discretion	 to	 enact	 firearms	 legislation	 under	 the	 single	market	 competence.	 In	 the	 European	 Union,	 this	 competence	derives	from	Article	114	TFEU,	and	in	the	United	States	from	the	Commerce	Clause.	As	Cuyvers	notes,	“[a]fter	all,	as	we	know	from	the	Commerce	Clause	in	the	US	Constitution,	almost	anything	can	be	said	to	affect	the	internal	market,	as	almost	all	rules	will	have	some	 (indirect)	 effect	 on	 cross-border-trade.”229	 The	 legislative	and	 judicial	 future	will	 demonstrate	 if	 both	 supreme	 courts	will	foster	 federalization	by	upholding	the	 federal	competence	under	
                                                        228.	 Christophe	Hillion,	Tobacco	Advertising:	If	You	Must,	You	May,	60	CAMBRIDGE	L.J.	486,	488	(2001).	229.	 Armin	Cuyvers,	The	Legal	Framework	of	the	EU,	in	EAST	AFRICAN	COMMUNITY	LAW	121	(Emmanuel	Ugirashebuja	et	al.	eds.,	2017).		
2020]	 FIREARMS	REGULATION	IN	THE	EU	 899	the	Commerce	Clause/Article	114	TFEU,	or	if	there	will	be	a	step	back	by	placing	more	limits	on	this	federal	competence.	Taking	a	step	back,	it	can	be	said	that	the	regime	of	firearms	in	the	European	Union	 and	 the	 United	 States	 may	 be	 substantially	 different.	Specifically,	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 constitutional	 right	 to	 bear	 arms	which	exists	 in	the	United	States	but	not	 in	the	European	Union.	However,	the	federal	regulation	of	firearms	may	be	very	similar	in	regard	 to	 the	 federal	 competence	 to	 regulate	 and	 its	 judicial	ramifications	at	the	respective	highest	courts	of	both	federal	legal	systems.																														
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